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Protecting the Mickey Mouse Ears:
Moving Beyond Traditional CampaignStyle Enforcement of Intellectual
Property Rights in China
Adela Hurtado*
Multinational corporations often struggle to protect their
intellectual property rights in China. The Walt Disney Company,
which has a long relationship with China, knows this all too well.
In fact, counterfeit Mickey Mouse ears—along with numerous
other Disney character goods—are now sold in plain sight at the
new Shanghai Disneyland Resort. In an attempt to combat
counterfeiting, companies such as Disney rely on a traditional
method of enforcement of intellectual property rights: government
campaigns. Campaigns are short periods of time during which
multiple raids and government enforcement actions occur to crack
down on counterfeiting. The irony of Disney’s situation is that less
than a year before the Shanghai Disneyland Resort opened Disney
was part of a high-profile campaign to protect its trademarks and
prevent counterfeiting at the new park. However, the results of the
Disney campaign are not surprising. Campaigns as practiced are
generally ineffective, with counterfeit goods manufacturers and
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sellers returning to their businesses within days. Herein lies the
issue: While campaigns are marked with a high volume of
enforcement, in the long-term they are ineffective for combating
intellectual property rights infringement. This Note uses Disney as
a case study to illustrate the present usage of campaigns as an
attempt to alleviate the infringement, despite their long-term
ineffectiveness. Though rarely used, there are new opportunities
for multinational corporations to incorporate civil litigation into
their anti-counterfeiting strategy as a means to move away from
depending heavily on campaigns and provide long-term change.
Additionally, a comparison to the United States version of a
campaign provides a new model for multinational corporations
which can be used to push for more effective practices that not
only benefit them, but also China. It is time for a new strategy to
combat infringement. By changing course, multinational
corporations and the government can strengthen intellectual
property rights in China.
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INTRODUCTION
Waiting on line for a Shanghai Disneyland ride can entail some
on-the-go shopping.1 A salesman will sneak through the lines and
approach those innocently waiting to offer a pair of Mickey Mouse
ears. 2 The seller will have them stashed in a black bag, with
headgear ranging from plain Mickey Mouse ears to his
counterpart’s Minnie Mouse ears that come with bows in a variety
of colors. 3 The ears will fetch a bargain price of 20 Renminbi
(“RMB”), equivalent to 3.11 USD, compared to the officially
licensed ears sold throughout the park ranging from 75 RMB
(roughly 12 USD) to 180 RMB (roughly 28 USD).4
The blatant disregard for intellectual property rights at the heart
of the park is a symptom of a larger problem plaguing The Walt
Disney Company (“Disney”) and other multinational companies
when conducting business in China. Globally, levels of intellectual
property infringement have significantly risen. 5 Most infringing
goods seized by U.S., European Union, and Japanese customs
authorities originate from East Asia, with China as the top
producer—accounting for over seventy percent of counterfeit
goods production and eighty-six percent when combined with
Hong Kong.6 Companies from each market segment and industry
1

Based on author’s observations and personal experiences during three trips to the
park in October, November, and December 2016. Specific instances are described in
Section II.B.1 [hereinafter Author’s Experiences].
2
The term “salesman” is used loosely here as this person is not an actual salesman,
but rather someone in plainclothes attempting to sell the Mickey ears.
3
Author’s Experiences, supra note 1.
4
The RMB is the Chinese national currency. See Matt Phillips, Yuan or Renminbi:
What’s the Right Word for China’s Currency?, WALL STREET J. (June 21, 2010),
https://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2010/06/21/yuan-or-renminbi-whats-the-right-wordfor-chinas-currency/ [https://perma.cc/2YZ7-NNN2]. For examples of headbands
currently on sale see, Search Results for “Headband”, on Disney Search, DISNEY,
https://search.disney.com/search?o=store&q=headband
[https://perma.cc/9J9L-4Z7X]
(last visited Nov. 24, 2017) (search in search bar for “Headband;” then select the “Store”
hyperlink to limit the search results). There are no websites with prices of headbands sold
in the parks.
5
See GLOB. INTELLECTUAL PROP. CTR., U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, MEASURING
THE MAGNITUDE OF GLOBAL COUNTERFEITING 5, 7 (2016), http://www.theglobalipcenter
.com/wp-content/themes/gipc/map-index/assets/pdf/2016/GlobalCounterfeiting_Report
.pdf [https://perma.cc/CP3X-ZS89].
6
See id. at 16, 19.
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experience billions of dollars in losses along with damage to their
brands’ reputation as a result of counterfeit production.7 The total
global economic value of counterfeit and pirated goods is as much
as 1.13 trillion dollars.8 The already billions of dollars in losses are
anticipated to multiply significantly in the years to come.9
However, companies that do business with and within China need
a way to cope with this reality. To cope, these companies primarily
rely on government agency campaigns, especially the raids
they include.10
Part I of this Note highlights the heavy reliance on campaigns
in China to enforce intellectual property rights, and uses Disney’s
recent campaign in China as an example of a company with a long
history in China that depends on the campaign approach. Part II
details the short-term advantages and long-term ineffectiveness of
the campaign approach, foreign companies’ rare use of civil
litigation to enforce their rights, and obstacles to effectively using
criminal prosecution. Part III argues that foreign companies should
stop relying on campaigns to enforce their rights and take
advantage of ample new opportunities in civil litigation. Part III
additionally proposes a model, using examples from campaigns
and corporate alliances in the United States, for a new type of
Chinese campaign approach. In sum, this Note aims to provide
alternative strategies for multinational corporations to move away
from solely using a traditional method of enforcement that will
never fully accomplish their goals to eradicate—or at least
reduce—infringement of their intellectual property rights in China.
7

Id. at 10; see also NATHAN WAJSMAN ET AL., OFFICE FOR HARMONIZATION IN THE
INTERNAL MKT., THE ECONOMIC COST OF IPR INFRINGEMENT IN THE CLOTHING,
FOOTWEAR AND ACCESSORIES SECTOR 14 (2015), https://euipo.europa.eu/tunnel-web/
secure/webdav/guest/document_library/observatory/resources/research-and-studies/ip_
infringement/study2/the_economic_cost_of_IPR_infringement_in_the_clothing_
footwear_and_accessories_sector_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/T5FG-CC2U]. For example,
the clothing, footwear, and accessories sector loses 26.3 billion euros of revenue
annually. See WAJSMAN ET AL., supra.
8
Andrew Baker, Toll of Counterfeiting and Piracy Predicted to Top $2.3 Trillion as
Call Made for Governments to Do More, DATADOT TECH. LTD. (Feb. 22, 2017),
http://www.ddotdna.eu/toll-of-counterfeiting-and-piracy-predicted-to-top-2-3-trillion-ascall-made-for-governments-to-do-more/ [https://perma.cc/Y9X4-NGBT]. Millions of
jobs are lost due to counterfeiting as well. See id.
9
See id.
10
See generally Part II.
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I. THE CHINESE CAMPAIGN AND DISNEY’S LONG STRUGGLE TO
COPE WITH INFRINGEMENT IN CHINA
Knowing who is charged with enforcing intellectual property
rights and where they stand in the context of the Chinese
government is important when exploring how multinational
corporations enforce their rights in China. First, Section I.A
provides an overview of and defines the powers of the Chinese
government and its intellectual property agencies. Section I.B
explains the campaign approach the government uses to combat
infringement in China. Section I.C then details the history of
Disney in China. Finally, Section I.D discusses the special
government campaign executed to protect Disney’s intellectual
property rights.
A. The Chinese Government Structure and Its Agencies
The Chinese government structure has several government
bodies that generally operate under the Chinese Communist
Party.11 According to China’s Constitution, the National People’s
Congress (“NPC”) is China’s legislative body.12 Among its roles,
the NPC elects the President and Vice President of the People’s
Republic of China.13 The NPC also introduces and drafts
legislation.14 The judicial system’s highest bodies are The Supreme
People’s Court and The Supreme People’s Procuratorate. 15 The
Supreme People’s Court supervises lower courts.16 The Supreme
People’s Procuratorate is charged with supervising regional and
special procuratorates, and investigating and prosecuting cases.17
The most relevant governing body for this Note is the State
Council, which carries out the Chinese government’s laws and
administrative functions.18 It is composed of ministries and
11

See XIANFA pmbl. (2004) (China).
See id. art. 2.
13
See id. art. 62, § 4.
14
See id. art. 62, §§ 1–3.
15
See id. arts. 127, 132; see also People’s Procuratorates, CHINA.ORG.CN,
http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/Brief/192298.htm
[https://perma.cc/FS2H4C3N] (last visited Dec. 17, 2017) (detailing a procuratorate’s judicial functions).
16
See XIANFA art. 127.
17
See id. art. 133; People’s Procuratorates, supra note 15.
18
See XIANFA arts. 85, 91.
12
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commissions and is led by the Premier, Vice Premiers, State
Councilors, Ministers, Auditor-General, and the Secretary
General,19 who are decided by the National People’s Congress.20
The State Council can adopt administrative measures, enact
administrative regulations, formulate tasks and responsibilities for
lower bodies, create national economic plans, and exercise other
powers.21 Its lower bodies include key intellectual property
enforcement agencies—such as the State Administration for
Industry and Commerce (“SAIC”); General Administration of
Customs; National Copyright Administration; and the State
Intellectual Property Office (“SIPO”), China’s patent office.22
The SAIC is in charge of market supervision and regulation in
China. 23 As part of its mission, the SAIC strives to protect the
“legitimate rights and interests of businesses and consumers by
carrying out regulations in the fields of enterprise registration,
competition, consumer protection, trademark protection and
combating economic illegalities.”24 To carry out this mission, the
SAIC consists of over ten departments and bureaus that focus on
specific issues.25 For example, the overwhelming majority—over
seventy-eight percent—of the SAIC’s cases involve products sold
that infringe on registered trademarks. 26 One bureau, the

19
See id. arts. 85–86. Ministries and commissions include the Ministry of Commerce
and the National Development and Reform Commission. See China’s State
Organizational Structure, CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, https://www.cecc.gov/
chinas-state-organizational-structure [https://perma.cc/5CKD-SKPE] (last visited
Nov. 24, 2017).
20
See XIANFA art. 62, § 5.
21
See id. art. 89 (defining these and other powers such as directing urban and rural
development, education, family planning, public security, foreign affairs, etc.).
22
See China’s State Organizational Structure, supra note 19.
23
See Mission, ST. ADMIN. FOR INDUS. & COMMERCE OF CHINA, http://www.saic.gov.cn
/english/aboutus/Mission/ [https://perma.cc/6PXY-323D] (last visited Nov. 25, 2017).
24
Id.
25
See Departments, ST. ADMIN. FOR INDUS. & COM. OF CHINA, http://www.saic.gov.cn/
english/aboutus/Departments/ [https://perma.cc/ZLS4-4BP2] (last visited Nov. 24, 2017).
26
TRADEMARK OFFICE/TRADEMARK REVIEW & ADJUDICATION BD. OF STATE ADMIN.
FOR INDUS. & COMMERCE, CHINA, ANNUAL DEVELOPMENT REPORT ON CHINA’S
TRADEMARK STRATEGY 2014, at 15 (2015), http://sbj.saic.gov.cn/sbtj/201505/
P020161012051169314721.pdf [https://perma.cc/VEW2-CGVX].
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Trademark Office, is in charge of these cases, along with
trademark registrations, and trademark disputes.27
B. Campaign-Style Enforcement in China
It is impossible to discuss intellectual property rights
enforcement in China without focusing on campaigns, or
zhuanxiang xingdong, which roughly translates to “special
campaigns.” 28 Campaigns, primarily used against copyright and
trademark infringement, are short periods of time during which an
agency or several agencies perform a series of quick raids and
enforcement actions against infringers.29 The campaign lasts
between one and two weeks, with a decision issued within a couple
of months.30 Campaigns are the most common type of intellectual
property rights enforcement action in China and usually the first
response to counterfeiting issues.31 The SAIC and its local
counterparts have the administrative power to conduct campaigns
on behalf of trademark holders.32 This agency, or another such as

27

See Departments, supra note 25.
The Chinese characters for “special campaign” are “专项行动.” As an example, this
term is used in the State Council’s 2013 regulatory document, Notice of the General
Office of the State Council on Issuing the 2013 Major Tasks for the Nationwide
Crackdown on IPR Infringements and on the Production and Sale of Counterfeit and
Shoddy Commodities, (Gen. Office of the State Council effective May 7, 2013),
CLI.2.201618 (EN) (PKULAW.CN), http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=201618
&lib=law [https://perma.cc/F2HS-79M8] (last visited Nov. 25, 2017).
29
MARTIN K. DIMITROV, PIRACY AND THE STATE: THE POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA 14–15 (2009); see also Xuefang Huang & Michael Lin, AntiCounterfeiting Options in China, MARKS & CLERK (Aug. 13, 2014), https://www.marksclerk.com/Home/Knowledge-News/Articles/Anti-counterfeiting-options-inChina.aspx#.WeJMKmW5659 [https://perma.cc/T525-ZJKK].
30
Huang & Lin, supra note 29.
31
See BOB YOUILL, FTI CONSULTING & PRACTICAL LAW CHINA, EFFECTIVE ANTICOUNTERFEITING ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA: STAGE BY STAGE 7 (2014),
http://www.fticonsulting-asia.com/~/media/Files/us-files/insights/reports/effective-anticounterfeiting-enforcement-china.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y26Q-UYJE];
see
also
DIMITROV, supra note 29, at 187 (discussing campaigns).
32
See Huang & Lin, supra note 29. Other agencies can also join the SAIC in a
campaign so responsibilities can be shared among them. See DIMITROV, supra note 29, at
187. The SAIC’s local counterparts are local bodies that carry out the SAIC’s operations
on the provincial, county, and municipal levels. See Trademark Registration in China,
PATH TO CHINA (last updated Jan. 3, 2018), http://www.pathtochina.com/reg_tm.htm
[https://perma.cc/R8CJ-HK25].
28
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SIPO, creates an “Action Plan” or “Implementation Plan” which
authorizes and coordinates intellectual property campaigns.33
Raids, a key component of campaigns, involve the SAIC and
law enforcement authorities sweeping through a market that sells
counterfeit goods or a factory that produces them. 34 During the
raid, the authorities confiscate the counterfeit goods and arrest
workers and sellers.35 Once rights holders are notified about the
counterfeit goods, they begin a raid by petitioning the SAIC with
documentation on the trademark and on the infringer.36 After the
SAIC processes the documentation, it will conduct the raid with
the help of law enforcement within one to two weeks of the
petition if it decides to do so.37 Once the raid is completed, if the
SAIC finds that infringement did in fact occur, it can “order[] the
infringer to cease the infringing conduct, confiscat[e] or destr[oy
the] counterfeit goods, [or] impos[e] fines” on the infringers.38 The
SAIC does not have the power to give monetary compensation to
the rights holders, as that is in the courts’ jurisdiction.39
The Disney campaign this Note focuses on in Section I.D
embodies much of the typical Chinese campaign. 40 The Disney
33

JIANFU CHEN, CHINESE LAW: CONTEXT AND TRANSFORMATION: REVISED AND
EXPANDED EDITION 803–04 (3d ed. 2015).
34
See Section II.B; see also, e.g., Shen Lu & Charles Riley, Police Raid Chinese
Factory that Was Churning Out Fake iPhones, CNNTECH (July 28, 2015, 6:23 AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2015/07/28/technology/china-fake-iphone-factory/index.html
[https://perma.cc/9GWK-E55B].
35
See, e.g., Lu & Riley, supra note 34.
36
See Huang & Lin, supra note 29. The owner of the intellectual property needs to
show proof of ownership of their rights and any materials they have on the infringement,
which can include trademark registration certificates and samples of infringing products.
See id.
37
See id.
38
See IPKEY, ROADMAP FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN CHINA 15 (2015),
www.ipkey.org/en/ip-law-document/download/3356/3805/23
[https://perma.cc/2YS4MW7G]. Fines imposed can be up to five hundred percent of the profits gained from the
counterfeit goods or up to the limit of 250,000 RMB (38,000 USD). CHEN, supra note 33,
at 806 (alterations in original).
39
IPKEY, supra note 38, at 13.
40
Affirming the similarities between campaigns, Simone Intellectual Property Services
firm (“SIPS”), a leading Hong Kong law firm serving multinational corporations in
China, stated that the Disney campaign was similar to initiatives of other short-term
campaigns occurring from time to time, such as the 2008 Olympic Games anticounterfeiting campaign. See Special Campaign on Protection of Disney Trademarks,
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campaign consisted of the SAIC announcing the campaign’s start
and subsequent enforcement efforts.41 The campaign was also
relatively long, lasting nearly a year.42
C. Disney’s Life in China
The Walt Disney Company was founded in 1923 and is based
in the United States.43 It is primarily in the filmmaking and
television businesses, but also builds its own theme parks around
the world and licenses its logos, films, and characters.44 Disney’s
repertoire includes its large intellectual property portfolio of over
five thousand trademarks and over one thousand patents—one of
their trademarks being Mickey Mouse and his ears, registered in a
variety of forms to ensure the character’s protection. 45 Disney
generates billions of dollars in revenue annually through
merchandising, licensing, and selling consumer products of its
intellectual property.46 As of 2016, its numerous ventures created a
SIPS, http://sips.asia/knowledge/legislation-and-policy/special-campaign-on-protectionof-disney-trademarks/ [https://perma.cc/P8ZV-QNF4] (last visited Nov. 25, 2017).
41
See id.
42
Compare id. (calling the Disney campaign an “unusual year-long campaign”), with
Huang & Lin, supra note 29 (stating that the average raid occurs within one to two
weeks, with decisions issued within a couple of months).
43
See About the Walt Disney Company, WALT DISNEY COMPANY,
https://thewaltdisneycompany.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/KHC6-AYHS] (last visited.
Dec. 22, 2017); Profile: Walt Disney Co (DIS.N), REUTERS, https://www.reuters.com/
finance/stocks/company-profile/DIS.N [https://perma.cc/89M4-VQKL] (last visited Dec.
21, 2017) (showing company is based in Burbank, California).
44
See Tom Delaney & Tami Stawicki, UNIV. CONN., THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY
(NYSE:DIS) (2016), http://smf.business.uconn.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/818/2016/
12/DIS-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/R3N4-P3QP].
45
See Disney Profile, JUSTIA, http://companyprofiles.justia.com/company/disney
[https://perma.cc/N7A4-V2Q3] (last visited Nov. 24, 2017); see also Jackson Gerber,
Note, Mickey Mouse in the Year 2023: What Happens Now?, TOURO L. REV. ONLINE
EDITION (Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.tourolawreview.com/2013/04/mickey-mouse-in-the
-year-2023-what-happens-now/ [https://perma.cc/6NWC-RTBE]. Examples of its
trademarks and uses associated with the Mickey Mouse ears are found in the Notice of
Opposition filed at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office against Deadmau5 in 2014. See
generally Notice of Opposition, Disney Enterprises, Inc., No. 6182.6914 (T.T.A.B.
Sept. 2, 2014) (notice of opposition)http://www.trademarkologist.com/files/2014/09/
Disney-Notice-of-Opposition.pdf [https://perma.cc/AJ69-B5PJ].
46
Walt Disney Co., Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities
Act of 1934 (Form 10-K) (Oct. 3, 2015), at 24, 65, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/1001039/000100103915000255/fy2015_q4x10k.htm
[https://perma.cc/8ABC-
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top brand valued at 39.5 billion USD. 47 Therefore, the issue of
counterfeiting in China is particularly important to the company, as
it has invested an enormous amount of time, resources, and capital
into expanding its business in the country.48
Disney’s relationship with China began on unfriendly terms
when the Mickey Mouse character and all Disney films were
banned in 1949 as part of a larger ban on foreign films when the
Communist Party rose to power. 49 In 1986, Disney was
“rehabilitated,” and the company in that year signed a licensing
agreement to supply cartoons for China’s national network.50
Disney then resumed its operations in China, only to have its films
banned again in the 1996 when the company released Martin
Scorsese’s “Kundun,” a film on the Dalai Lama’s life, through its
subsidiary Touchstone Pictures. 51 The ban continued until 1999,
when the government allowed the release of Disney’s “Mulan” in
exchange for agreements to hire Jackie Chan as a voice actor for

HTHX]; Marc Graser, Disney Brands Generate Record $40.9 Billion from Licensed
Merchandise in 2013, VARIETY (June 17, 2014), http://variety.com/2014/biz/news/
disney-brands-generate-record-40-9-billion-from-licensed-merchandise-in-20131201221813/ [https://perma.cc/JW8D-D5YS]; Natalie Robehmed, The ‘Frozen’ Effect:
When Disney’s Movie Merchandising Is Too Much, FORBES (July 28, 2015),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/natalierobehmed/2015/07/28/the-frozen-effect-whendisneys-movie-merchandising-is-too-much/#22ca8ce22ca8
[https://perma.cc/R8KR-5HDS].
47
See The World’s Most Valuable Brands, FORBES (2016), https://www.forbes.com/
pictures/mli45fflem/8-disney/#98c794050643.
48
See China Has Become Important Market for Walt Disney International,
XINHUANET (July 13, 2017, 7:41 PM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-07/13/c
_136441501.htm [https://perma.cc/6HEQ-G7U4].
49
See ASIAN POPULAR CULTURE: THE GLOBAL (DIS)CONTINUITY 59 (Anthony Y.H.
Fung ed., 1st ed. 2013); TAN YE & YUN ZHU, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF CHINESE
CINEMA 1 (1st ed. 2012); Clay Chandler, Mickey Mao, FORTUNE (Apr. 18, 2005),
http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2005/04/18/8257022/index
.htm [https://perma.cc/PYX7-UPVA].
50
Chandler, supra note 49.
51
Daniel Frankel, ‘Mulan’ Freed for Release in China, E! NEWS (Feb. 8, 1999),
http://www.eonline.com/news/37704/mulan-freed-for-release-in-china
[https://perma.cc/V94G-HSRG]; Bernard Weinraub, Disney Will Defy China on Its Dalai
Lama Film, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/11/27/movies
/disney-will-defy-china-on-its-dalai-lama-film.html [https://perma.cc/JKM8-BVR4].
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the Mandarin version of the film and to distribute two Chinese
films in the United States.52
Despite its precarious status in the country, Disney persisted
with its relationship with China.53 Disney first broke ground with
the opening of Hong Kong Disneyland in 2005.54 While not on the
mainland, the Hong Kong theme park marked what Bob Iger,
President of The Walt Disney Company, stated was the “first big
step” to expand the company’s reach into China. 55 Disney then
increased its efforts. Most notably, after ten years of planning and
five years of construction, Disney opened Shanghai Disneyland
Resort in June 2016 in partnership with state-owned Shanghai
Shendi Group.56 The park cost five-and-a-half billion dollars and
covers 963 acres, making the park three times larger than its Hong
Kong counterpart.57 The Shanghai Disneyland Resort also has the
tallest Disney castle ever built in all its parks. 58 The park soon
became a hit with over eleven million visitors in its first year.59
However, regardless of its status in the People’s Republic of
China, Disney continues to suffer from widespread intellectual
52

See Erik Eckholm, Easing Tensions, Disney Gains O.K. to Show ‘Mulan’ in China,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/08/world/easing-tensionsdisney-gains-ok-to-show-mulan-in-china.html [https://perma.cc/C9NR-V753]; Frankel,
supra note 51.
53
For more examples of Disney bans see, Alyssa Abkowitz & Eva Dou, AlibabaDisney Partnership Is Frozen in China, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 26, 2016),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/alibaba-disney-partnership-frozen-in-china-1461645337;
Joe McDonald, China Bans ‘Simpsons’ from Prime-Time TV, WASH. POST (Aug. 13,
2006),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/13/
AR2006081300242.html [https://perma.cc/SW6W-2P38].
54
See Associated Press, Disney Opens Theme Park in Hong Kong, NBC NEWS (Sept.
12, 2005), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/9311663/ns/business-world_business/t/disneyopens-theme-park-hong-kong/#.WcgdHmVd-58 [https://perma.cc/GWV5-23RJ].
55
Id.
56
See John Gaudiosi, Why Disney’s New Shanghai Park Is Its Most Ambitious Yet,
TIME
(June
16,
2016),
http://time.com/4371493/shanghai-disneyland-park/
[https://perma.cc/2GFF-W6RV]; Julie Makinen, Shanghai Disney Officially Opens: A
Peek Inside, L.A. TIMES (June 17, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/la-fi-shanghai-disneyopening-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/LRN8-W5PA].
57
Gaudiosi, supra note 56.
58
Id.
59
See Eunice Yoon, Shanghai Disneyland Visitors Top [Eleven] Million in Its First
Year, Blowing Past Expectations, CEO Iger Says, CNBC (June 16, 2017),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/16/shanghai-disneyland-visitors-top-11-million-in-itsfirst-year-blowing-past-expectations-ceo-iger-says.html [https://perma.cc/VA66-XQRR].
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property infringement through online and physical markets, as
counterfeiters flood China with pirated Disney products.60
D. Disney Turns to the Campaign Approach
The irony of recent infringement under Disney’s “nose” is
highlighted by Disney’s path to eliminate this infringement. While
the current infringement situation in China is challenging, Disney
continued to cultivate its relationship with China and developed a
coping strategy.61 So far, the company’s primary strategy appears
to be to “keep a close relationship with local government officials
and to cry out loudly and often to get their ear.”62 Disney’s strategy
led to the SAIC launching a year-long campaign (the “Disney
Campaign”) to “crack down” specifically on Disney trademarks.63
The SAIC called this campaign a “special action” to protect Disney
in anticipation of Shanghai Disneyland Resort’s grand opening in
June 2016, perhaps due to Disney’s joint venture with the
Shanghai government firm.64 In addition to protecting the Disney
brand, the SAIC declared that this campaign also sought to protect
60

See, e.g., Angela Doland, In China, There’s Not Just Disney, There’s ‘Dlsnay’ and
‘Disnesy’ Too, AD AGE (June 2, 2016), http://adage.com/article/cmo-strategy/chinadisney-disnesy/304220/ [https://perma.cc/U3RT-ND3B]; Alice Hines, Fake Apple,
Disney and Ikea Stores: The Ultimate Knockoffs?, AOL FIN. (Aug. 10, 2011, 11:00 AM),
https://www.aol.com/article/2011/08/10/apple-and-ikea-stores-the-ultimate-knockoffsthe-u-s-obsessio/20013610/ [https://perma.cc/2HPM-8V6J]; Special Campaign on
Protection of Disney Trademarks, supra note 40. Section II.B.1 also has examples of
Disney counterfeit goods in China.
61
See Adam Jourdan, China Says Disney to Get Special Trademark Protection,
REUTERS
(Nov.
5,
2015),
http://uk.reuters.com/article/us-walt-disney-chinaidUKKCN0SU1ED20151105 [https://perma.cc/7994-MKP9].
62
Yang Jie, China Rolls Out ‘Emergency Teams’ to Knock Out Disney Knockoffs,
WALL STREET J. (Nov. 5, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2015/11/05/chinarolls-out-emergency-teams-to-knock-out-disney-knockoffs/
[https://perma.cc/5VYZ-JFJ3].
63
For the original notice by the SAIC in Mandarin see, Gongshang Zongju Guanyu
Kaizhan Baohu “Dishini” Zhuce Shangbiao Zhuanyongquan Zhuanxiang Xingdong de
Tongzhi (工商总局关于开展保护 “迪士尼”注册商标专用权专项行动的通知),
Notice of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce on the Special Action to
Protect the Exclusive Right of the Registered Trademark of Disney, SAIC (Nov. 5, 2015),
http://www.saic.gov.cn/zw/zcfg/gzjwj/201511/t20151105_216928.html
[https://perma.cc/V8NV-NR2X]; see also Neil Gough, China Moves to Crack Down on
Counterfeit Disney Products, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015
/11/06/business/media/disney-china-trademark.html [https://perma.cc/K6HF-J3JW].
64
See Gough, supra note 63.
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the future development of the Shanghai Disneyland Resort and to
“uphold China’s international image for safeguarding intellectual
property rights.”65
The Disney Campaign entailed numerous actions to crack
down on Disney counterfeits. The SAIC declared it would
establish a “key protected area” around the Shanghai Disneyland
Resort and strengthen patrols in this area.66 The enforcement
efforts in this protected area were to be significantly increased to
“comprehensively eliminate” infringement.67 The SAIC then
created “emergency teams” (similar to teams that carry out raids)
to watch for counterfeits, whether on sale online or elsewhere, and
to coordinate efforts among national and local officials. 68 The
SAIC charged local SAIC divisions and authorities with inspecting
wholesale distributions, production factories, and where
trademarks are printed.69 The SAIC also called for local agencies
to carry out “collective rectification” against local infringers.70
Additionally, the SAIC encouraged authorities nationwide to
strengthen enforcement and narrow opportunities for people to
infringe Disney’s trademarks.71 Edward Chatterton, a Hong Kong
intellectual property lawyer, commented at the time, “I don’t think
I’ve seen a specific brand being protected in this sort of
comprehensive way before.” 72 These moves, focusing solely on
Disney products and its trademarks, were unprecedented.73
Results soon came in. Within two months, officials seized a
large batch of counterfeit Disney children’s clothing in
65

Special Campaign on Protection of Disney Trademarks, supra note 40.
Yuen Yeuk-Iaam, Counterfeiters ‘Feel No Pressure’ Despite China’s Crackdown on
Disney
Copyright
Infringement,
GLOBAL
TIMES
(Nov.
12,
2015),
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/952354.shtml [https://perma.cc/MV36-ZRBD].
67
Special Campaign on Protection of Disney Trademarks, supra note 40.
68
See Jie, supra note 62; Special Campaign on Protection of Disney Trademarks,
supra note 40.
69
See Jie, supra note 62; Special Campaign on Protection of Disney Trademarks,
supra note 40.
70
Special Campaign on Protection of Disney Trademarks, supra note 40.
71
See id.
72
Gough, supra note 63.
73
See Rhonda Tin, Trademark Protection in China – If Everyone Could Be Disney,
AWAPOINT (Feb. 29, 2016), http://awaipblog.com/trademark-protection-in-china-ifeveryone-could-be-disney/ [https://perma.cc/S9DP-7QRZ].
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Hangzhou,74 a city about one hundred miles from Shanghai.75 In
addition, officials fined five fake Disney hotels built near where
the Shanghai Disneyland Resort was to be built. 76 The SAIC
reported that during the campaign period it handled a total of one
hundred and twelve Disney trademark infringement cases. 77 The
Disney seizures and raids that were featured in various news
outlets were subsequently seen by the media as promising signs
that Disney will be successful in enforcing its rights.78 The rapid
results may seem impressive at first glance. However, by using the
ineffective campaign approach, Disney would not achieve its goal
of combating infringement against its trademarks, or even
reducing it.
II. THE CAMPAIGN TRAP: IT IS INEFFECTIVE, BUT IS THERE A
WAY OUT?
Despite its repeated use, the campaign approach has not
worked. Part II focuses on how the campaign strategy has rarely
worked to successfully combat infringement in its current form for
multinational companies or for intellectual property rights in
general. Section II.A discusses incentives to using the campaign
approach while Section II.B examines its overall ineffectiveness,
details the problems with multinational corporations’ present use

74

See id.; see also Wang Hongyi, Counterfeit Disney Products Target of Trademark
Campaign, CHINA DAILY (Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/kindle/201601/13/content_23071315.htm [https://perma.cc/F3GT-P4Y2].
75
Distance from Shanghai to Hangzhou, DISTANCEFROMTO, https://www.distance
fromto.net/distance-from-shanghai-cn-to-hangzhou-cn [https://perma.cc/VAH4-XAFA]
(last visited Dec. 21, 2017).
76
John Ruwitch, China Fines Five Phony Disney Hotels - Xinhua, REUTERS (Nov. 25,
2015),
http://www.reuters.com/article/disney-china-idUSL3N13K20K20151125
[https://perma.cc/JQ5A-QG8Z].
77
There are no details as to the outcome of these cases. See TRADEMARK
OFFICE/TRADEMARK REVIEW & ADJUDICATION BD. OF STATE ADMIN. FOR INDUS. &
COMMERCE, CHINA, ANNUAL DEVELOPMENT REPORT ON CHINA’S TRADEMARK STRATEGY
2016, at 15 (2017), http://sbj.saic.gov.cn/sbtj/201709/W020170901344688293241.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4WP3-VAXN].
78
See David Barboza & Brooks Barnes, How China Won the Keys to Disney’s Magic
Kingdom, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/15/business
/international/china-disney.html [https://perma.cc/262W-WTS5].
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of civil litigation, and explores the obstacles to using
criminal prosecution.
A. The Short-Term Advantages of Campaigns
Campaigns are used because multinational corporations and
other rights holders prefer the cheapest and fastest method to solve
their counterfeiting issues.79 Campaigns have some short-term
tangible effects. During the campaign period, factories and stores
are closed down, large amounts of counterfeit goods are
confiscated, and counterfeiters are arrested.80 People selling
counterfeits on the streets are removed quickly.81 The volume of
enforcement is also high during campaign periods.82 Agency
officials and law enforcement officers work overtime investigating
rights holders’ claims. 83 Raids performed during the campaign
period are also inexpensive and fast, and the rights holder receives
results quickly.84 The temptation to obtain this type of enforcement
is understandable for these reasons, and may explain why it is
often used.
Results from campaign-related raids make headlines in national
and international papers. For example, in February 2017, a raid
resulted in seized counterfeit Chanel, Christian Dior, and other
brand-name cosmetics worth 120 million USD.85 In May 2017, the
79

DIMITROV, supra note 29, at 189.
See supra Section I.B; infra Section II.B.
81
See supra Section I.B; infra Section II.B.
82
See supra Section I.B.
83
PETER K. YU, The Curious Case of Fake Beijing Olympics Merchandise, in
TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND TERRITORIALITY CHALLENGES IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 263
(Irene Calboli et al. eds., 2014).
84
See U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, CHINA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT,
INDIGENOUS INNOVATION POLICIES, AND FRAMEWORKS FOR MEASURING THE EFFECTS ON
THE U.S. ECONOMY 1–8 (2010), https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4199.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6GXZ-HS49]; Harley I. Lewin, Understanding the Challenges and
Nuances of Defending Intellectual Property Rights in China, in INSIDE THE MINDS:
DEFENDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS CASES IN CHINA (Astapore 2013); see also
supra Section I.D.
85
This raid occurred in Taizhou, an eastern city in China, and was initiated in response
to reports of related counterfeit goods sold online. See Adam Jourdan, Chinese Police
Seize $120 Million of Fake Cosmetics, REUTERS (Feb. 15, 2017),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-cosmetics-fakes-idUSKBN15V02Y
[https://perma.cc/2DD7-6K52].
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media reported the largest raid seizure of brand-name counterfeit
sports shoes, with around five hundred thousand pairs taken.86 The
Disney Campaign in China, especially the raids and seizures
resulting from it, similarly achieved headlines in multiple news
outlets. 87 The Chinese government also publicizes its campaigns
through their websites and often point out items seized from
raids. 88 The China Chamber of International Commerce recently
mentioned the Disney Campaign in a comment to the Office of the
U.S. Trade Representative as an example of China substantially
improving its intellectual rights protection. 89 Campaign results
generate publicity and may create a sense that serious, effective
action is being taken against counterfeiting, making campaigns
attractive to multinational corporations.
B. The Long-Term Ineffectiveness of Campaigns
1. The Transient Effects of Campaigns
Experts often criticize campaigns as “incur[ring] high
administrative cost[s] with transient effects.”90 Multinational
corporations criticize the SAIC’s actions because shortly after a
raid, even as soon as the next day, infringers return to selling
counterfeit goods. 91 After numerous raids, counterfeiting
86

The raid occurred at a factory in Anhui province, and eleven people were arrested.
See Catherine Lai, Chinese Police Bust Factory Making Fake Nike, Vans, Converse
Shoes, H.K. FREE PRESS (May 26, 2017), https://www.hongkongfp.com/2017/05/26/
chinese-police-bust-factory-making-fake-nike-vans-converse-shoes/
[https://perma.cc/KPT4-2QVV].
87
See Gough, supra note 63; Jie, supra note 62; Jourdan, supra note 61; Ruwitch,
supra note 76.
88
See, e.g., Measures Taken, CHINA CUSTOMS ENF’T OF INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS,
http://english.customs.gov.cn/topic/customs12/Measures%20Taken.htm
[https://perma.cc/M5LM-353D] (last visited Nov. 25, 2017).
89
See China Chamber of Int’l Commerce, Summary of Testimony in Comment Letter
on Section 301 Investigation: China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to
Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation 1 (Sept. 26, 2017) (on file
with Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal).
90
See, e.g., Yana Jin et al., Air Pollution Control Policies in China: A Retrospective
and Prospects, INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. & PUB. HEALTH, Dec. 2016, at 10. Dimitrov’s book
is dedicated to criticizing campaign enforcement. See generally DIMITROV, supra note 29.
91
See FN Staff, [Three] Big Issues that China Faces in Counterfeiting Battle,
FOOTWEAR NEWS (Sept. 20, 2016), http://footwearnews.com/2016/business/retail/3-bigobstacles-counterfeiting-shoes-china-259833/ [https://perma.cc/7LF8-Y5B9].
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operations move on to another town or factory, and continue to
operate until they are subject to yet another campaign once
companies request enforcement measures again.92 One notable
example of the transient effects of campaigns is the 2008 Olympic
campaign. Leading up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the Chinese
government made several decrees establishing a campaign to
protect the Olympic symbols and other trademarks related to the
games.93 Tens of thousands of government personnel across China
worked overtime to crack down on counterfeits.94 However,
counterfeit 2008 Olympics goods were still easy to find, during the
campaign and afterwards.95 Vendors selling counterfeit Olympics
goods continued to plague tourists. 96 Pirated versions of the
opening ceremony popped up frequently in markets, even as close
as two weeks after the ceremony itself.97 Despite the campaign and
the high volume of enforcement actions, the sale of counterfeit
merchandise was still widespread across China.98
Another high-profile example of an ineffective campaign was
the 2011 month-long campaign to eradicate imitation Apple Inc.
(“Apple”) stores and unauthorized sellers of Apple products.99 The
campaign began when an imitation Apple store found in Kunming,
China made headlines around the world.100 Upon further search of
the city, over twenty other imitation Apple stores were found.101
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DIMITROV, supra note 29, at 14–15.
YU, supra note 83, at 262–63.
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Id. at 263.
95
Id. at 264.
96
Id. at 264–65.
97
Id. at 265.
98
Id. at 264.
99
These are physical retail stores imitating Apple Inc. stores. This campaign differs
from the Disney Campaign as it did not focus on the Apple trademark, but rather physical
stores and counterfeits generally, because of the international attention the Kunming
imitation Apple stores received. The campaign was also not as comprehensive or as long
as the Disney campaign. See Xu Wei, Unauthorized Apple Retailers Face Logo Ban,
CHINA DAILY (Aug. 8, 2011), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2011-08/08/
content_13071315.htm [https://perma.cc/9W7V-JD8M].
100
See id.; see also Chinese Authorities Find [Twenty-Two] Fake Apple Stores, BBC
(Aug. 12, 2011), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-14503724 [https://perma.cc/
3NVQ-7PC9] (last visited Nov. 24, 2017).
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93

2018]

PROTECTING THE MICKEY MOUSE EARS

439

Several of these stores were shut down in Kunming.102 Imitation
stores in Beijing’s technology district Zhongguancun were ordered
to stop using the Apple logo, but many stores remained open after
the campaign. 103 Beijing store managers were slow to respond,
with one stating: “If you come back a few days later, everything
will be back as it was.”104 Imitation Apple stores even thrived in
anticipation of a new phone’s launch.105 The number of imitation
Apple stores has decreased over the years, but its decline could be
credited to factors such as Apple’s increased physical presence in
China, and a growing preference for locally-made technology,
instead of the anti-counterfeiting campaign.106
As a final example, Disney counterfeit goods are also alive and
well, even inside the Shanghai Disneyland Resort itself.107 During
2016 and 2017, visitors reported seeing counterfeit Minnie Mouse
ears and Mickey Mouse hats sold in plain sight. 108 One visitor
102

See China Officials Close Fake Apple Stores in Kunming City, BBC (July 25, 2011),
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-14273444
[https://perma.cc/PN9T-LPSC];
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See Wei, supra note 99.
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Id.
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See Yimou Lee, China’s ‘Fake’ Apple Stores Thrive Ahead of New iPhone Launch,
REUTERS
(Sept.
23,
2015),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-chinaidUSKCN0RN2EF20150924 [https://perma.cc/QYS2-ADEP].
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(Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-china-idUSKCN0V4200
[https://perma.cc/5Q9C-V6AW].
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See Author’s Experiences, supra note 1; see also Cathy Wu, Fake Disney Hotel
Website Scrapped After Exposé, THAT’S MAGS (June 7, 2016), https://www.thatsmags
.com/shanghai/post/13980/fake-disney-hotel-website-scrapped-after-exposure
[https://perma.cc/4BUN-MADQ] (exposing a related incident where a fake Shanghai
Disney Resort website was created to swindle unsuspecting customers).
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See, e.g., Review by diablodancer, Falling Far Short of Disney’s Usual Standards,
TRIPADVISOR (June 14, 2017), https://www.tripadvisor.com/ShowUserReviews-g308272d10383031-r492990183-Shanghai_Disneyland-Shanghai.html#REVIEWS
[https://perma.cc/6L33-AJ4G]; Review by Donald K, Not Quite ‘Disney’, TRIPADVISOR
(Mar. 18, 2017), https://www.tripadvisor.com/ShowUserReviews-g308272-d10383031r468220239-Shanghai_Disneyland-Shanghai.html#REVIEWS [https://perma.cc/Z7X8NYAC]; Review by KellyLoChu, Most Beautiful Disneyland So Far! Absolutely Worth
Visiting!, TRIPADVISOR (Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.tripadvisor.com/ShowUserReviews
-g308272-d10383031-r477016475-Shanghai_Disneyland-Shanghai.html#REVIEWS
[https://perma.cc/TV9C-RAW5]; Review by TCspeech, Spectacular Light Show in a
Clean Theme Park, TRIPADVISOR (Dec. 3, 2016), https://www.tripadvisor.com/
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.html#REVIEWS [https://perma.cc/5TMA-HLQL]; Review by TRVLtruth, The Good,
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stated: “People are selling counterfeit merchandise from back
packs all over the park.” 109 Another described numerous people
“selling fake [D]isney items, raincoat[s,] and even cigarettes.”110
On July 15, 2017, one traveler wrote there were people “walking
up and down INSIDE the queues selling fake Disney merchandise
(e.g., light-up toys, keychains, etc.).” 111 The traveler went on to
state that “[t]he first time it happened to us, I stared at the person in
shock and she interpreted it as my interest to purchase something
from her.” 112 On September 1, 2017, another traveler similarly
wrote: “[T]here [is] a black market, people [are] selling the same
as the shops in the [D]isney street cheaper.” 113 Six days later a
visitor stated there were “[h]awkers selling (counterfeit?) swag all
over the place, especially in the lines.”114 A disappointed visitor
singled out Shanghai Disneyland Resort: “[O]nly here we can find
people selling unauthorized merchandise [at] a lower price than [in
the] official store.”115 More examples of Disney counterfeits
are abundant.116
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For a campaign that specifically set out to eliminate Disney
counterfeits, these results are dismal. Despite the campaign’s
promises to protect the Shanghai Disneyland Resort area with
emergency teams and strengthened patrols, counterfeits remain
prevalent in the park.117 Just as in other campaigns, there
were short term improvements, but no lasting change.118
2. The Overuse of Campaign-Style Enforcement
Despite its transient effects, the campaign approach is the tool
of choice for solving infringement problems in China. At first,
campaigns against infringement generally coincided with visiting
foreign intellectual property or trade delegations, but since then
campaigns have become a common government action.119 For the
past several years, the annual agency “Action Plan” or
“Implementation Plan” specifically coordinated the use of
intellectual property-related campaigns.120 For example, one of
these intellectual property campaigns, “Special Campaign to
Combat IPR Infringement and the Manufacture and Sales of
Counterfeit and Shoddy Commodities,” lasted nine months.121 The
Chinese government declared it a “huge success,” drawing
attention to the high number of cases handled during campaign,
even though counterfeit goods production is rising with China as
the top culprit.122 In 2013, the government announced a six-month
d10383031-r498461153-Shanghai_Disneyland-Shanghai.html#REVIEWS
[https://perma.cc/Q8J5-5G6S].
116
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Visitors, TRIPADVISOR (June 20, 2017), https://www.tripadvisor.com/ShowUserReviewsg308272-d10383031-r494709754-Shanghai_Disneyland-Shanghai.html-REVIEWS
[https://perma.cc/Z4TV-SBWK].
117
See Jie, supra note 62; Special Campaign on Protection of Disney Trademarks,
supra note 40.
118
See discussion supra Section II.B.1.
119
CHEN, supra note 33, at 803; see also Danielle Mihalkanin & Brad Williams,
China’s Special Campaign to Combat IPR Infringement, CHINA BUS. REV. (Oct. 1, 2011),
https://www.chinabusinessreview.com/chinas-special-campaign-to-combat-iprinfringement/ [https://perma.cc/BF6Z-3LBC].
120
CHEN, supra note 33, at 803–04.
121
See Mihalkanin & Williams, supra note 119.
122
Id.; see also supra notes 6–9 and accompanying text.
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campaign to combat counterfeit pharmaceutical products.123 In
2014, the government created another campaign promising to fight
intellectual property infringement online and elsewhere, such as
websites advertising counterfeit products. 124 Another 2015
government campaign, “Red Shield Net Sword,” similarly focused
on purging counterfeits in online sales and lasted five months.125
Every year the government carries out campaigns, yet counterfeit
production is still rising in China.126
Multinational corporations reinforce the use of government
campaigns (especially the raids that come with them) by relying on
them to enforce their rights.127 For example, similarly to Disney,
other multinational corporations will establish close relationships
123

See Michael Martina & Megha Rajagopalan, China Launches Crackdown on
Pharmaceutical Sector, REUTERS (July 17, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/uschina-multinationals-crackdown/china-launches-crackdown-on-pharmaceutical-sectoridUSBRE96G06C20130717 [https://perma.cc/6TE6-6SNJ].
124
See China to Crack Down on Online Piracy, Counterfeit Goods, CHINA DAILY
(Apr. 14, 2014), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-04/14/content_17432977.htm
[https://perma.cc/U6DV-E8EU].
125
For the original notice in Mandarin see Gongshang Zongju Guanyu Kaizhan 2015
Hongdun Wangjian Zhuanxiang Xingdong de Tongzhi (工商总局关于开展 2015 红盾网
剑专项行动的通知), Notice of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce on
Carrying out the Special Campaign of the 2015 Red Shield Network Sword (promulgated
by the St. Admin. for Industry & Com., June 3, 2015) ST. ADMIN. FOR INDUSTRY & COM.
CHINA, June 1, 2015, http://www.saic.gov.cn/zw/zcfg/gzjwj/201506/t20150603_
216912.html [https://perma.cc/79KG-DGNC]; see also Deanna Wong, China’s SAIC
Sharpens Its Blades for Its 2015 ‘Red Shield Net Sword’ Enforcement Campaign,
LIMEGREEN IP NEWS (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.limegreenipnews.com/2015/09/chinassaic-sharpens-its-blades-for-its-2015-red-shield-net-sword-enforcement-campaign/
[https://perma.cc/5WFM-3VLW]; Gillian Wong, Chinese Regulator Announces New
Crackdown on Online Sales of Fakes, WALL STREET J. (June 4, 2015),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-regulator-announces-new-crackdown-on-onlinesales-of-fakes-1433414502.
126
For example, the State Council in 2017 announced it would create new intellectual
property campaigns, along with several campaigns for other issues such as product
quality. See Guowuyuan Bangongting Guanyu Yinfa 2017 Nian Quanguo Daji Qinfan
Zhishi Chanquan he Zhishou Jiamao Weilie Shangpin Gongzuo Yaodian de Tongzhi (国
务院办公厅关于印发 2017 年全国打击 侵犯知识产权和制售假冒伪劣商品工作要点
的通知), Notice of the General Office of the State Council on Issuing the Key Points in
the Work of 2017 National Crackdown on IPR Infringement and the Manufacturing and
Sale of Fake and Shoddy Goods, ST. COUNCIL (May 16, 2017),
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017-05/31/content_5198504.htm
[https://perma.cc/W6B6-M6ER].
127
See FN Staff, supra note 91.
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with enforcement agencies, such as the SAIC, to induce
enforcement measures.128 After the SAIC conducts a raid, the
foreign company may treat the SAIC officials and investigators to
dinner and karaoke, and give them public recognition for their
role.129 If corporations cannot obtain SAIC’s help, they can hire
independent local “providers,” or private investigators, to conduct
raids as a quick way to get goods off the market.130 Providers
can be one-man operations or large companies that cater to
multinational corporations in need of enforcement. 131
Multinational corporations fall into the temptation of using the
campaign approach to solve their intellectual property problems,
which feeds into the government’s continued use of campaigns.132
Companies occasionally initiate their own anti-counterfeiting
actions, but these ultimately resemble the Chinese campaign, as
they are short term attempts to combat infringement. For example,
in 2006, Disney gave customers the opportunity to enter contests
for free Disney prizes if they mailed in the hologram stickers on
official Disney merchandise. 133 Microsoft initiated its own anticounterfeiting actions as well.134 One action in 2008 consisted of
causing a black screen to display every hour for users of pirated
versions of Windows XP.135 Microsoft then began a “Keep it Real”
anti-counterfeiting effort in 2012 after purchasing 169 computers
128

PEGGY E. CHAUDHRY & ALAN ZIMMERMAN, PROTECTING YOUR INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS: UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENTS,
CONSUMERS AND PIRATES 154 (1st ed. 2013).
129
Id.
130
See YOUILL, supra note 31. An example of the inability obtain the SAIC’s assistance
is the lack of sufficient evidence that infringement took place. See CHINA IPR SME
HELPDESK, ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA 2 (2013),
http://www.china-iprhelpdesk.eu/sites/all/docs/publications/EN_Enforcement_Aug2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6NV-WSJH].
131
See YOUILL, supra note 31.
132
See FN Staff, supra note 91.
133
See Geoffrey A. Fowler, Disney Marketing Plan Fights Piracy in China Consumers
to Collect Stickers for Contest, WASH. POST (May 31, 2006), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/archive/business/2006/05/31/disney-marketing-plan-fights-piracy-in-china-spanclassbankheadconsumers-to-collect-stickers-for-contestspan/8a5181bc-7142-494a-85788c95ace58f75/ [https://perma.cc/72HE-EH4A].
134
See Reuters, Software Pirates in China Beat Microsoft to the Punch, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 18, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/19/business/global/19iht-windows
.html [https://perma.cc/XA4U-HJSF].
135
See id.
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from shops in China, and finding that all were installed with
pirated versions of Windows.136 As part of this effort, it notified
sixteen Beijing sellers, who repeatedly sold these computers with
pirated software, to stop.137 In 2015, still facing massive pirating,
Microsoft took a different course by simply offering free upgrades
to Windows 10 to all Windows users, whether or not they were
running genuine copies of the software.138 Just as with government
campaigns, these efforts by multinational corporations are shortterm and bring little long-term effects. Both the government and
foreign companies have become heavily reliant on short-term
actions, whether in the form of campaigns or general
anti-counterfeiting efforts.
3. Conflicts of Interest and Corruption Within Campaigns
Campaigns are also rendered ineffective due to conflicts of
interest and corruption. A major conflict of interest is the local
government’s incentive to keep the local economy thriving, as
local government authorities from different districts compete with
each other for investment and growth, versus true enforcement of
rights.139 Although top government authorities, such as the SAIC
and the State Council, may coordinate campaigns, local
government officials may not always carry them out correctly.140
Incentivized to protect local economic activity, local officials
impose light fines and lax enforcement on local counterfeiters,
even in the face of orders from high officials.141 For example, a
factory producing counterfeits at times can be the “largest single
employer in the province,” so a government official will call the

136

See Michael Kan, Microsoft Launches Anti-Piracy Campaign in China,
COMPUTERWORLD H.K. (Dec. 16, 2012, 6:48 AM), http://cw.com.hk/news/microsoftlaunches-anti-piracy-campaign-china [https://perma.cc/QGZ6-5J97].
137
See id.
138
See Paul Carsten & Bill Rigby, Microsoft Tackles China Piracy with Free Upgrade
to Windows [Ten], REUTERS (Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/usmicrosoft-china-idUSKBN0ME06A20150318 [https://perma.cc/8MBK-8VH7].
139
YI-CHIEH JESSICA LIN, FAKE STUFF: CHINA AND THE RISE OF COUNTERFEIT GOODS 48
(1st ed. 2011).
140
Id. at 48–51.
141
Id. at 48.
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police and stop the ordered agency raid from occurring.142 A local
agency may also accept bribes from both rights holders and
counterfeiters, and will conduct—or fail to conduct—enforcement
actions depending on which bribe is higher or depending on
whether the counterfeiters contribute significantly to the local
economy. 143 Enforcement becomes selective, with agencies
focusing on “easy” cases, such as counterfeits being sold in a store,
rather than finding and closing down whole enterprises that
produce the counterfeits.144 Raids, although the traditional method
used by foreign companies as part of campaigns, merely become
“propaganda show[s],” or illusions that action is being taken,
instead of genuine enforcement.145 Despite numerous raids,
counterfeit items are still common in China partly due to
conflicting interests within the Chinese government itself.146
Independent local providers hired by corporations to conduct
enforcement actions can also be corrupt, even working with
counterfeiters to manufacture counterfeit goods and then “seize”
them, and also create other obstacles to enforcing rights. 147 As
these providers are paid on commission, counterfeit seizures mean
higher fees, creating an incentive to work with counterfeiters or
manufacture their own counterfeit goods.148 For example, in 2015,
the Associated Press released an investigative report that found
142

TIM PHILLIPS, KNOCKOFF: THE DEADLY TRADE IN COUNTERFEIT GOODS 64
(1st ed. 2005).
143
See DIMITROV, supra note 29, at 186.
144
Id. at 187.
145
LIN, supra note 139, at 48; see also Kathy Chu, In the Fight Against Counterfeits,
Even the Raids Can Be Fake, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/in-the-fight-against-counterfeits-even-the-raids-can-be-fake-1449171005.
For
example, along with the corruption noted earlier, counterfeiters have found ways to evade
consequences, such as hiding evidence before authorities arrive based on tip-offs, so
when a raid does occur it is ineffective. See id.
146
Kevin Lewis, The Fake and the Fatal: The Consequences of Counterfeits, 17 PARK
PLACE ECONOMIST 47, 51 (2009).
147
See Erika Kinetz, Who’s Investigating Fake Chinese Goods? Fake Investigators,
SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB. (Dec. 9, 2015), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdutwhos-investigating-fake-chinese-goods-fake-2015dec09-story.html
[https://perma.cc/4KGF-82DW].
148
See China Anti-Counterfeiting Agents Make Many of the Fakes Themselves –
Report, GUARDIAN (Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/11/
china-anti-counterfeiting-agents-make-many-of-the-fakes-themselves-report
[https://perma.cc/NX6T-MYF9].
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“anti-counterfeiting investigators were widely involved in copying
products of their own western customers.”149 In another example, a
company hired an investigator to track down counterfeit antidandruff shampoo in China. 150 Instead of conducting the
investigation, he instead set up a factory to produce the shampoo
himself which he then seized, calling it a successful raid.151 As a
final example, Gucci brought an intellectual property case to court
against a Chinese infringer relying on its investigator’s documents
stating that two thousand counterfeit Gucci eyeglasses were found
during a raid.152 The court dismissed Gucci’s case, finding that the
documents may have been forged.153 Alexander Theil, an
investigator who supervised thousands of raids for counterfeit
goods mostly in China, stated that in many raids, “numbers are
faked, documents are faked or there is something fishy.”154
Conflicts of interests and corruption are rampant in raids, but the
government and multinational corporations continue to rely
heavily on them, whether as part of campaigns or as part of general
anti-counterfeiting measures.
4. The Responsive Nature of Campaigns
As campaigns in China are responsive by nature, they are not
dedicated to solving the root cause of intellectual property
infringement. They are measures designed as a “rapid resolution of
a major problem,” done in response to pressure by a company or
government authority as well as in crisis situations. 155 Pressure
from government authorities to look good in the face of massive
infringement, or a company’s board of directors looking for a fast
solution to the situation in China, can also drive these short-term
solutions.156 For example, when China began its quest to join the
World Trade Organization, it turned to campaigns to crack down
on counterfeits, leading to these campaigns’ characterization as
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Chu, supra note 145.
Id.
Id.
DIMITROV, supra note 29, at 4.
See FN Staff, supra note 91.
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“political and diplomatic” measures to respond to foreign pressure
rather than true enforcement of intellectual property rights.157
Customs enforcement of intellectual property rights also fluctuated
depending on the level of U.S. government pressure.158 Provinces
that are more dependent on foreign investment have significant
amounts of enforcement actions against counterfeiters, while
provinces that do not have foreign investment have little to
none. 159 Overall, campaigns come about if there is pressure or
financial incentive, whether it is to combat criticism or drive
investment, and not out of the true need for intellectual property
enforcement itself.160
5. Foreign Companies’ Rare Use of Civil Litigation
Campaigns are used very often, which creates the impression
that there must be no other possible method of effective intellectual
property rights enforcement. 161 This is not the case, but
corporations are neglecting alternative avenues. Disney has
brought few intellectual property infringement cases in China since
1994—only three—when compared to its vast number of cases
handled in the United States. 162 Disney’s over 3,500 intellectual
157

Max Goldberg, Enclave of Ingenuity: The Plan and Promise of the Beijing
Intellectual Property Court 16 (May 19, 2017) (unpublished B.A. thesis, Yale
University), http://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=
ceas_student_work [https://perma.cc/5R9V-GKRU]; see also DIMITROV, supra note 29,
at 24–36.
158
See DIMITROV, supra note 29, at 79.
159
See id. at 57.
160
DEZAN SHIRA & ASSOCS., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA 29
(Chris Devonshire-Ellis et al. eds., 2d ed. 2011).
161
See supra Section II.B.2.
162
This data is based on the Chinese version of IPHouse, a database of over 200,000
criminal, administrative, and civil cases filed in China. IPHOUSE, http://en.iphouse.cn/
[https://perma.cc/TJ7C-2F66]. To reach this number, the author searched IPHouse to find
the total number of IP civil litigation cases brought by Disney since 1980, and confirmed
that no other cases were brought prior to 1994. To conduct this search query: (1) Select
“Roles” on the IPHouse homepage; (2) then select “Litigant” under the “Roles” section;
and (3) enter the Mandarin character name for Disney (“迪士尼”) into the search bar.
Three names—two versions of “The Walt Disney Company” (“迪士尼企业公司” and
“迪士尼公司”) and the third, Disney China (“华特迪士尼((中国))有限公司”)—appear
with results under each name. For each of the three names: (1) Select the respective
named hyperlink; (2) scroll down to the bottom of the page and follow the “See more”
hyperlink; and finally, (3) filter the results by limiting the query to cases after 1980. This
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property matters in the United States alone consist of more than
1,457 copyright, 1,760 patent, and 362 trademark cases, motions
and filings.163 The lack of Chinese civil litigation cases, although
having a high win rate, mirrors the trend for multinational
corporations in general in China.164
Even more troubling, the number of foreign intellectual
property cases is actually shrinking. In 2013, foreign cases
comprised 1.9% of all intellectual property cases in China.165 In
2014, the number of foreign intellectual property cases dropped to
1.8%.166 This number shrank further in 2015 to a mere 1.2%.167 In
contrast, the number of total intellectual property cases in China is
generally rising. Chinese courts received 133,863 cases in 2014,
130,200 cases in 2015, and a record number of 152,072 in 2016.168
Mandarin name search revealed two civil suits where Disney was the plaintiff: One of the
suits is the 2016 case discussed infra Section III.A.2, and the other is a suit from 2003.
Additionally, the author returned to the “Litigant” page and entered the English version
of the name “Disney” into the search bar. This revealed one litigant name, “Disney
Enterprises, Inc.” Similar to the Mandarin search: (1) Follow the named hyperlink; and
(2) scroll down to select “See more.” This search query yielded only one result, a 2005
civil suit brought by Disney, where it again was awarded damages. In total, three cases
have been brought by Disney since 1994. Disney is also known as a strong trademark
enforcer in the United States. For an overview of a of few of its latest trademark cases
see, Chelsea Wold, Big Mouse in the House: Disney Trademark Oppositions, LAWINSPIRING.COM (Jan. 19, 2017), http://lawinspiring.com/2017/01/19/disney-trademarkoppositions/ [https://perma.cc/A236-ST6P].
163
Case Activity for The Walt Disney Company, LAW360, https://www.law360.com/
companies/the-walt-disney-company/dockets [https://perma.cc/2AP6-HVZ5] (last visited
Nov. 25, 2017). Disney’s case activity (as of February 2, 2017) also includes suits related
to labor law, contracts, personal injury, and civil rights. See id.
164
See Mark Cohen, Patent Litigation, Local Protectionism and Empiricism: Data
Sources and Data Critiques, CHINA IPR (Mar. 10, 2016), https://chinaipr.com/2016/03/
10/patent-litigation-local-protectionism-and-empiricism-data-sources-and-data-critiques/
[https://perma.cc/82M6-R2XE] [hereinafter Patent Litigation, Local Protectionism and
Empiricism]; Mark Cohen, Summarizing the SPC’s 2015 White Paper, CHINA IPR (Apr.
22, 2016), https://chinaipr.com/2016/04/22/summarizing-the-spcs-2015-white-paper/
[https://perma.cc/H9LD-7TBV] [hereinafter Summarizing the SPC’s 2015 White Paper];
Section III.A (discussing, in part, examples of Disney’s civil litigation success in China).
165
Summarizing the SPC’s 2015 White Paper, supra note 164.
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
See Mark Cohen, 2014 Judicial IPR White Paper Shows Huge Growth in Trademark
Appeals, CHINA IPR (Apr. 21, 2015), https://chinaipr.com/2015/04/21/2014-judicial-iprwhite-paper-shows-huge-growth-in-trademark-appeals/ [https://perma.cc/9Z29-ZVUV];
Summarizing the SPC’s 2015 White Paper, supra note 164; Cao Yin, China’s Courts Saw
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Based on the data, it seems local Chinese companies have much
less hesitancy to use the civil litigation system than their
foreign counterparts.
Foreign companies make up a miniscule percentage of the civil
litigation docket, but it is unclear why, as there are no explanations
from the companies themselves. Instead of using the courts,
Disney chose the campaign approach.169 Companies may see civil
litigation, despite its advantages and improvements discussed in
Part III, as costly and time-consuming to bring for intellectual
property infringement when counterfeits are abundant. However,
civil trademark and copyright cases generally take an average of
four months to complete and have enduring consequences, unlike
the campaign approach.170 The hesitancy could also be a matter of
unfamiliarity with the Chinese court system. Whatever the reason,
the civil litigation system is severely neglected by
foreign companies.
6. Obstacles to Using Criminal Prosecution Effectively
Criminal prosecution is another way to enforce intellectual
property rights in China, but one fraught with difficulties.
Intellectual property infringement is expressly prohibited under the
Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (“Chinese
Criminal Law”).171 Companies can bring cases directly to the
Public Security Bureau (“PSB”) or administrative bodies such as
Record Number of IP Cases in 2016, CHINA DAILY (Apr. 24, 2016),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-04/24/content_29059335.htm
[https://perma.cc/7TSS-YVW6]. The 2015 number includes 101,324 civil litigation cases,
but breakdowns for each year are not available. See Summarizing the SPC’s 2015 White
Paper, supra note 164.
169
See supra Section I.D; see also supra note 164 and accompanying text.
170
To see this data, one needs to register for free at CIELA, a database of Chinese
intellectual property cases. See CIELA, ANALYSING COPYRIGHT CIVIL INFRINGEMENT
CASES: ALL COURTS (2015) (on file with Fordham Intellectual Property, Media &
Entertainment Law Journal) [hereinafter CIELA COPYRIGHT: ALL COURTS]; CIELA,
ANALYSING TRADE MARK CIVIL INFRINGEMENT CASES: ALL COURTS (2015) (on file with
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal) [hereinafter CIELA
TRADEMARK: ALL COURTS].
171
See Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 14, 1997, effective Oct. 1, 1997) (EN),
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1384075.htm
[https://perma.cc/ZNN3-E5JL].
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the SAIC will transfer the cases to the PSB.172 In either option, if
there is sufficient evidence, the PSB will then hand the case over to
a people’s prosecutor for criminal prosecution.173 However, several
challenges make criminal prosecution difficult.
Criminal prosecution for these cases comes with high
thresholds. A trademark infringer is punished if the case is of a
“serious” nature, and in the case of an “especially serious” nature,
the time of imprisonment lengthens. 174 Knowingly selling
trademark-infringing merchandise with a “relatively large” sales
volume can be punished with imprisonment, criminal detention,
and fines. 175 Forging or manufacturing of a “serious” nature is
punished the same way.176 If the amount of the illicit income for
forging or manufacturing is “especially serious,” then the time for
imprisonment is extended. 177 The Supreme People’s Court
interpreted the above trademark thresholds to mean that trademark
infringement is punishable if the illegal business volume is 50,000
RMB (7,496 USD) or above, or if the amount of illegal profits is at
least 30,000 RMB (4,552 USD).178 Thresholds are applied to other
types of intellectual property infringement; copyright infringers are
punished if “the amount of illegal gains is relatively large” or if
there are “other serious circumstances,” and patent infringers are
similarly punished when the “circumstances are serious.”179
Each type of illegal activity is only illegal if the circumstances
are “serious,” which may overlook one-man infringers and
infringers with small to medium scale operations, entirely in favor
of only catching the big fish. The thresholds focus on the volume
of the enforcement instead of the intellectual property right itself,
implying the notion that people can infringe intellectual property
172

See Ryan Ong, Tackling Intellectual Property Infringement in China, CHINA BUS.
REV. (Mar. 1, 2009), https://www.chinabusinessreview.com/tackling-intellectual-property
-infringement-in-china/ [https://perma.cc/CDU6-T5GN].
173
See id.
174
Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 213 (EN).
175
Id. art. 214.
176
Id. art. 215.
177
Id.
178
MICHAEL BLAKENEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT: A COMMENTARY ON
THE ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT (ACTA) 202 (1st ed. 2012).
179
Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, arts. 216–17 (EN).
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rights in certain cases.180 The United States brought these
thresholds under scrutiny when it made a request for consultations
to the World Trade Organization, claiming that the thresholds do
not follow article 61 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights, which the two countries promised
to follow.181 Article 61 states: “Members shall provide for criminal
procedures and penalties to be applied at least in cases of willful
trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial
scale.”182 Member countries found that China’s “quantitative
thresholds would not capture counterfeiting activities of limited
value or smaller quantities,” and that these small scale illegal
activities are “clearly meaningful,” as they contribute to the chain
of infringement.183 The panel formed to investigate the claim
further noted the lack of criminal procedures and penalties for
crimes falling below the thresholds.184 Eventually, the panel found
that China’s criminal measures do exclude some copyright and
trademark infringement because of the thresholds, but also found
that article 61 does not require member states to criminalize all
copyright and trademark infringement.185
As a result, Chinese criminal law remains unchanged to the
detriment of rights holders. Only a select group of rights holders
are protected. Evidencing this selectivity, a 2015 study of 376
Chinese intellectual property criminal cases, the United States’
official statistics on about half of these cases, official U.S. and
Chinese statistics on IP criminal and administrative enforcement in
180

See BLAKENEY, supra note 178.
See DS362: China — Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights, WORLD TRADE ORG. [WTO], https://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds362_e.htm [https://perma.cc/HR6Z-6P29] (last visited
Nov. 24, 2017). A request for consultations “formally initiates a dispute in the WTO.”
The Process – Stages in a Typical WTO Dispute Settlement Case, Part of Dispute
Settlement System Training Module: Chapter [Six], WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c6s2p1_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/KBN7-H2K5]
(last visited Nov. 25, 2017).
182
Panel Report, China – Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights, ¶ 7.502, WTO Doc. WT/DS362/R (adopted Jan. 26, 2009).
183
Id. ¶ 7.438.
184
See id. ¶¶ 7.444–46.
185
WTO, CHINA – INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS SUMMARY (2017 ed., 2010),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/1pagesum_e/ds362sum_e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SV9R-FKJB].
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both countries, and in-depth interviews with intellectual property
law practitioners in China, revealed that those who successfully
brought criminal infringement cases were in a “handful of
economically or politically powerful companies in a few particular
industries.”186 The study found that state-owned enterprises
comprised 49% of these companies and 44% were companies with
controlling foreign shareholders or foreign intellectual property
rights, such as multinational corporations or corporations that hold
foreign brands.187 A mere 6.7% of Chinese criminal infringement
cases involved domestic private and collective companies.188
The majority of criminal infringement cases are also concentrated
in a few companies with well-known brands, with at least 89.7% of
all criminal infringement cases, whether foreign or domestic,
falling into this category.189
As it stands, only cases involving the biggest brands, or that
seriously undermine the socialist market economy, are prosecuted,
whether foreign or domestic.190 The opposite is the case for
administrative petitions, such as those to the SAIC requesting
raids, whose petitioners belong to a variety of industries and
brands.191 Overall, the Chinese criminal system handles a very
small amount of infringement cases, with the vast majority of them
being handled by administrative agencies. 192 The deficiencies in
the current Chinese criminal law lead to less cases prosecuted, less
companies protected, and less opportunities for intellectual
property holders to enforce their rights.193 They also lead to
companies turning to campaigns, as the thresholds limit criminal
186

Haiyan Liu, The Policy and Targets of Criminal Enforcement of Intellectual
Property Rights in China and the United States, 24 WASH. INT’L L.J. 137,
151–52, 154 (2015).
187
See id. at 154.
188
See id. at 155.
189
See id. at 156–57.
190
See id. at 156–57, 172.
191
See id. at 167.
192
See id. at 168.
193
See id. at 165, 186. Enforcement against online counterfeiting operations also suffers
from the high thresholds; police only begin investigations into operations if there is a
strong possibility the thresholds can be met. See INTA ANTICOUNTERFEITING COMM.
CHINA SUBCOMM., ONLINE COUNTERFEITING ISSUES AND ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA 7
(2015),
https://www.inta.org/Advocacy/Documents/2015/Online%20Counterfeiting%
20Issues%20and%20Enforcement%20in%20China.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CTL-CWP2].
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prosecution.194 This is worrisome as campaigns generally have
only temporary effects.
However, when it comes to engaging the criminal justice
system, these companies fall into a trap just as they do when it
comes to campaigns. Their routine strategy is to build rapport with
officials and pay fees for officials to investigate their claims,
thereby securing the prioritization of their cases from local
criminal law enforcement.195 This strategy is noted, just as
for campaigns in general, as leading to piecemeal and ineffective
enforcement.196 The current pattern leads to criminal prosecution
only when the biggest foreign companies plead enough to instigate
action from officials.197 This creates yet another unnecessary
responsive enforcement regime.198
In conclusion, the campaign approach as currently practiced is
inherently weak and ineffective, and multinational corporations are
reinforcing its use by nearly exclusively using campaigns. Upon
announcement of the Disney Campaign, Jack Clode, the cofounder of Blackspeak Group, a firm working on trademark
enforcement issues in China, correctly asked: “Authorities will
keep Disney happy and will get a few wins against
counterfeiters—but the question is, [w]hat sort of long-term effect
will this have?”199 This question conveys the crux of the problem
with the current campaign approach: A campaign is a short-term
solution for a long-term problem. As the results of campaigns have
shown, the answer to his question is very little.

194

See Liu, supra note 186, at 163 (noting how companies “seek criminal . . .
processing when cases reach prosecution thresholds”).
195
See id. at 163–64.
196
See id. at 164.
197
See id. at 165.
198
See id.
199
Gough, supra note 63.
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III. MOVING BEYOND: INVESTING IN CIVIL LITIGATION, MODIFYING
THE CAMPAIGN APPROACH, AND CREATING PRODUCTIVE
ALLIANCES
In September 2017, the State Council’s Ministry of Commerce,
the ministry in charge of domestic and foreign trade,200 announced
yet another campaign to attack intellectual property rights
infringement. 201 The campaign has the hallmarks of the classic
Chinese campaign: it is responsive to external pressure, as it was
created to increase foreign investment, and will last for a short
period of time, from September to December 2017.202 With these
hallmarks, it is highly likely this will be another campaign with
transient effects. Lance Noble, Policy Director for the European
Union Chamber of Commerce in China, seemed to recognize this
and commented: “As welcome as further public commitments to
protecting [intellectual property rights] are, this cannot be achieved
through a campaign-style approach.” 203 He stated that instead,
there needs to be “sustained commitment” to enforcement.204
This campaign was also critiqued at the section 301
Investigation and Hearing that the U.S. Trade Representative
conducted on October 10, 2017. 205 This investigation examined
200
See Mission, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE CHINA (Dec. 7, 2010) http://english.mofcom
.gov.cn/column/mission2010.shtml [https://perma.cc/8MBN-JYGP].
201
See China Launches Campaign to Protect IPRs of Foreign Companies, CHINA’S
WEBSITE FOR CAMPAIGN AGAINST IPR INFRINGEMENTS & COUNTERFEITS (Sept. 19, 2017),
http://english.ipraction.gov.cn/article/TopNews/201709/20170900155494.shtml
[https://perma.cc/4R33-CYRY].
202
See id. But see China’s Crackdown on Intellectual Property Theft Wasn’t Driven by
Outside Pressure: Official, CNBC (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/
2017/09/28/china-crackdown-on-intellectual-property-theft-wasnt-driven-by-outsidepressure-official.html [https://perma.cc/4UXS-NPTD] (noting the Chinese Ministry of
Commerce’s denial that the campaign was a result of foreign probes).
203
Joe McDonald, China Announces Trade Secrets Crackdown to Assure Investors, AP
NEWS (Sept. 20, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/ap-china-announces-tradesecrets-crackdown-to-assure-investors-2017-9 [https://perma.cc/K9BG-WRXK]. The
European Union Chamber of Commerce in China is an organization consisting of 1,600
member European companies and is recognized as the “official voice of European
business in China.” About the Chamber, EUR. UNION CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN CHINA,
http://www.europeanchamber.com.cn/en/european-chamber-background
[https://perma.cc/44XS-ZEAP] (last visited Nov. 24, 2017).
204
McDonald, supra note 203.
205
See Initiation of Section 301 Investigation; Hearing; and Request for Public
Comments: China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer,
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China’s actions and policies regarding technology transfer,
intellectual property, and innovation. 206 Mark Cohen, a Senior
Counsel at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office who has over
thirty years of experience handling intellectual property issues in
China, served as a panel member at the hearing.207 He noted the
campaign’s time period of only three months and asked: “Many
scholars think that these short campaigns have limited duration and
effect . . . . So I’d like to know why is this particular program any
different from other ones before it? Why not extend it or make it
permanent? Or perhaps should the focus be on judicial reform or
other areas?”208
This Part will provide some answers to Cohen’s questions on
how to improve enforcement and how multinational corporations
can participate. Multinational corporations need to do their part in
changing the enforcement paradigm, and work towards a long-term
solution instead of falling into the campaign trap.209 This can occur
in several ways. Section III.A examines recently-created tools and
developments in the civil litigation system, such as the new
intellectual property courts, the long-term effects of recent rulings
on Chinese intellectual property law, and recent successes with
preliminary injunctions. Section III.A also urges companies to take
advantage of these opportunities through new and increased use.
Section III.B then proposes modifications to the existing Chinese
campaign approach using examples from campaigns in the United
States and multinational brand alliances. Instead of relying heavily
on campaigns and their raids, multinational corporations should
Intellectual Property, and Innovation, FED. REG. (Aug. 24, 2017),
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/08/24/2017-17931/initiation-of-section301-investigation-hearing-and-request-for-public-comments-chinas-acts-policies
[https://perma.cc/DR3U-WLW3].
206
See id.
207
See Section 301 Investigation and Hearing: China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices
Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation, Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative 162, No. USTR-2017-0016-0063 (Oct. 10, 2017),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=USTR-2017-0016-0063
[https://perma.cc/2GD6-9AP9]. The transcript is available for download at the above
link. See also Biography of Mark Cohen, Senior Counsel, U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office, U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REV. COMM’N (2016), https://www.uscc.gov/
sites/default/files/Admin%20Panel_Cohen_Bio.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UN5-BX55].
208
Section 301 Investigation and Hearing, supra note 207, at 164–65.
209
Id. at 164–66.
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A. Opportunities in Civil Litigation
1. Establishment of the New Intellectual Property Courts
The Chinese government looks to the civil litigation system as
a place to combat infringement. To develop more protection for
intellectual property rights, in 2014 the government developed
several intellectual property courts (“IP Courts”) in Beijing,
Shanghai, and Guangzhou.210 These courts handle intellectual
property cases and over time they have become more specialized in
the subject matter.211 Other characteristics of the intellectual
property courts are important to note. Although China is a civil law
country and its courts are not required to follow precedent, the
highest IP Courts have issued “guiding” cases and model rulings to
inform lower courts on key issues. 212 For example, they have
issued guiding cases on evidence preservation and preliminary
injunctions, allowing these methods to become possible options for
intellectual property owners. 213 The Beijing IP Court has cited
prior cases in its rulings, making for a more uniform rule of law

210

For the original decision see, Decision of the Standing Committee of the National
People’s Congress on Establishing Intellectual Property Right Courts in Beijing,
Shanghai and Guangzhou, (Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., effective Aug. 31,
2014), CLI.1.232867 (EN) (PKULAW.CN), http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=232867
&lib=law (last visited Nov. 25, 2017).
211
See Mark Cohen, A Deeper Dive into the Jurisdiction and Role of Specialized IP
Courts, CHINA IPR (Nov. 15, 2014), https://chinaipr.com/2014/11/15/a-deeper-dive-intothe-jurisdiction-and-role-of-specialized-ip-courts/ [https://perma.cc/ZW79-R486].
212
See Mark Cohen, Spring Time for IPR Case Law in China?, CHINA IPR
(Mar. 12, 2017), https://chinaipr.com/2017/03/12/spring-time-for-ipr-case-law-in-china/
[https://perma.cc/2L3N-SWLR]; see also ROBBINS COLLECTION, UNIV. CAL. BERKELEY
SCH. OF LAW, THE COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW TRADITIONS 1 (2010),
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/library/robbins/pdf/CommonLawCivilLawTraditions.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4K4H-JKCY] (describing the civil law system). For an example of the
issuance of guiding cases see, Xiaohan Lou et al., Translation, Supreme People’s Court
Annual Report on Intellectual Property Cases (2015) (China), 26 WASH. INT’L. L.J. 147,
149–69 (2016).
213
See Xiang Li et al., China’s Specialized IP Courts, WOLTERS KLUWER: KLUWER
PATENT BLOG (Apr. 10, 2017), http://kluwerpatentblog.com/2017/04/10/chinasspecialized-ip-courts/?print=pdf [https://perma.cc/Q87R-4NJX].
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regarding intellectual property rights. 214 The IP Courts are also
now publishing their decisions on a database for the public,
creating more consistency and transparency as older cases are
easier to find for judges deciding new ones.215
In 2017, the government established new specialized circuit
intellectual property tribunals (“IP Tribunals”) in Nanjing, Suzhou,
Chengdu, and Wuhan, which will spread opportunities for
intellectual property rights enforcement to other areas of China for
national and foreign companies.216 IP tribunals are “attached” to
the existing people’s courts in those cities. 217 These tribunals
resemble the IP Courts in the sense that they exercise jurisdiction
over intellectual property cases, and have judges with extensive
experience with intellectual property litigation. 218 Unlike the IP
Courts, they have cross-regional jurisdiction, meaning they can
handle cases from a variety of cities in a region.219 Overall, the
civil litigation system for intellectual property rights is greatly
improving, and foreign companies should not hesitate to use them.
2. High Win Rates for Foreign Companies
Civil litigation is the key way companies can combat
infringement for long-term change. Chinese law, such as the
Chinese Trademark Law (“Trademark Law”), gives companies the
right to sue infringers. 220 Disney was one of the first foreign
companies to see the advantages of civil litigation when it brought
214

See Cohen, supra note 212.
Zhongguo Zhishi Chanquan Caipan Wenshu Wang (中国知识产权裁判文书网),
[China IPR Judgments and Decisions], SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. CHINA (China),
http://ipr.court.gov.cn/ [https://perma.cc/K7QU-FY8J] (last visited Jan. 27, 2018).
216
See Li et al., supra note 213.
217
Id.
218
See id.
219
See id.
220
See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shangbiao Fa (Genju 2013 Nian 8 Yue 30 Ri
Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui 《 Guanyu Xiugai (Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo Shangbiao Fa) de Jueding》 Xiuzheng (中华人民共和国商标法 (根
据 2013 年 8 月 30 日全国人民代表大会常务委员会《关于修改〈中华人民共和国商
标 法 〉 的 决 定 》 修 正 )) [Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 23, 1982; amended Aug.
30, 2013, effective May 1, 2014), art. 60, translated in World Intell. Prop. Org. [WIPO],
at 19–20, Lex. No. CN195 (2014) (EN), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=
13198 [https://perma.cc/D9MQ-Z6H7].
215
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an intellectual property infringement case in 1994 in Beijing. 221
The Beijing court in Walt Disney Co. v. Beijing Press and Xinhua
Bookstores ruled against three Chinese publishing and distribution
companies for their production of children’s books based on
Disney’s animated films and characters without the company’s
approval.222 Disney received a 227,000 yuan judgment against the
Chinese companies. 223 Disney’s latest intellectual property
infringement civil case in 2016 was another win for the
company.224 The Shanghai IP Tribunal levied a 194,440 USD
judgment against two infringing companies who created
characters, titles, and posters substantially similar to those from
Disney and Pixar’s “Cars” and “Cars 2” films.225
Foreign companies in general have a high win rate for
intellectual property-related civil litigation and even “had a 100%
win rate” against counterfeiters in the Beijing IP Court in 2015.226
For all copyright infringement cases, whether foreign or domestic,
across China there is still a high 85% win rate in court.227 The win
rates for copyright cases in the Beijing and Shanghai courts are
82% and 92%, respectively.228 Trademark cases across China boast

221

See CHAUDHRY & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 128, at 20–21; Mo Zhang, International
Civil Litigation in China: A Practical Analysis of the Chinese Judicial System, 25 B.C.
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 59, 76 (2002).
222
Zhang, supra note 221, at 76–77; see also Analysis of Walt Disney of the United
States v. Beijing Publishing Press, etc. for Infringement of Copy Rights, PKULAW.CN,
http://pkulaw.cn/(S(21ctss45i13hjxjvmt44tijw))/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=qikan&Gid=151
0087600 [https://perma.cc/HM6Z-M9S3] (last visited Nov. 22, 2017).
223
See Analysis of Walt Disney of the United States v. Beijing Publishing Press,
supra note 222.
224
See Disney Wins Copyright Infringement Case Against Chinese Companies, CHINA
DAILY (Jan. 3, 2017), http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2017-01/03/content_
27844721.htm [https://perma.cc/PJ23-XQVP].
225
See id. The Shanghai IP Tribunal is administered by the Shanghai Pudong New Area
People’s Court and was established specifically for the Shanghai Pudong area. See
Dispute Settlement System, SHANGHAI MUN. PEOPLE’S GOV’T (Sept. 13, 2017),
http://www.shanghai.gov.cn/shanghai/node27118/node27818/u22ai87437.html
[https://perma.cc/7RYK-ZPVX].
226
Patent Litigation, Local Protectionism and Empiricism, supra note 164.
227
CIELA COPYRIGHT: ALL COURTS, supra note 170. These figures are as of 2015.
228
CIELA, ANALYSING COPYRIGHT CIVIL INFRINGEMENT CASES: BEIJING (2015) (on file
with Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal) [hereinafter
CIELA COPYRIGHT: BEIJING]; CIELA, ANALYSING COPYRIGHT CIVIL INFRINGEMENT
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a 91% win rate.229 The Beijing and Shanghai courts have win rates
of 88% and 87%, respectively, for trademark cases.230 The
consistently high win rate, as well as their successes over the years
in Chinese courts, should show foreign companies that the Chinese
civil litigation system is more reliable to stop infringers in the
country than the campaign approach.
3. Civil Litigation’s Long-term Effects on Chinese Law
Civil litigation also has long-term effects on Chinese law. For
example, as a result of several cases, the Trademark Law was
revised with tougher restrictions on infringement.231 In 2011,
Danjaq LLC, the U.S. company that produces the James Bond
films, brought one such case that changed this law.232 Danjaq LLC
brought a civil case against a Chinese condom maker who used the
Chinese characters for “James Bond, 007” and the name in English
as the trademark logos for its products.233 The condom producer
argued that its trademark was valid and its products were in an
unrelated business.234 However, the Beijing High People’s Court
ruled that the condom producer “violated the ‘principle of good
faith’ required under China’s trademark law when a trademark is
registered.” 235 It also ruled that trademarks cannot infringe on
CASES: SHANGHAI (2015) (on file with Fordham Intellectual Property, Media &
Entertainment Law Journal) [hereinafter CIELA COPYRIGHT: SHANGHAI].
229
CIELA TRADEMARK: ALL COURTS, supra note 170.
230
CIELA, ANALYSING TRADE MARK CIVIL INFRINGEMENT CASES: BEIJING (2015) (on
file with Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal)
[hereinafter CIELA TRADEMARK: BEIJING]; CIELA, ANALYSING TRADE MARK CIVIL
INFRINGEMENT CASES: SHANGHAI (2015) (on file with Fordham Intellectual Property,
Media & Entertainment Law Journal) [hereinafter CIELA TRADEMARK: SHANGHAI].
231
See Trademark Law Set for Major Shakeup, CHINA’S WEBSITE FOR CAMPAIGN
AGAINST IPR INFRINGEMENTS & COUNTERFEITS (Feb. 17, 2017), http://english.ipraction
.gov.cn/article/Policies/201702/20170200125065.shtml [https://perma.cc/76PR-KB6C].
232
See id.; see also Company Profile of Danjaq LLC, BLOOMBERG,
https://www.bloomberg.com/profiles/companies/0731761D:US-danjaq-llc
[https://perma.cc/7ZVC-BBYK] (last visited Nov. 24, 2017).
233
Trademark Law Set for Major Shakeup, supra note 231.
234
See id.
235
Id. (quoting the Beijing High People’s Court). The principle of good faith is violated
when a trademark applicant knows of the existence of a person’s prior use of an
unregistered trademark, and proceeds to apply to register that same trademark. See Li
Yunquan, China’s New Trademark Law Strengthening Good Faith Requirement in
Trademark Registration and Use, WANHUIDA PEKSUNG, http://www.wanhuida.com/en/
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existing rights. 236 Consequently, the government created a new
regulation as part of the Trademark Law taking effect in 2017 to
protect well-known characters, including those in books and
movies.237 The regulation stated that those characters and titles of
works protected by copyright law cannot be used as trademarks by
any entity that does not hold the copyright, unless the copyright
holder grants permission.238
This new regulation, created from a civil intellectual property
case and not from a campaign,239 is useful for companies such as
Disney who rely largely on its characters for business. Setting
precedent through civil litigation makes it easier for companies to
protect their trademarks, and to prove infringement in future civil
cases. If a foreign company uses the civil litigation system, not
only will they likely have a successful result, but also will likely
permanently change laws in favor of intellectual property
rights holders.
4. Higher Damages Awarded for Intellectual Property
Civil Cases
The amount of damages won against infringers has risen, with
the Beijing IP Court in a case between plaintiff Beijing Watchdata
Data Systems Co. Ltd. and defendant Hengbao Co. Ltd. issuing its
highest award for its jurisdiction to date, approximately 7.5 million
USD, in December 2016.240 This civil case is also notable because
it was the first time an award included an order for compensation
tabid/259/ArticleID/3361/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/C2MX-WTJN] (last visited Nov.
25, 2017).
236
See Trademark Law Set for Major Shakeup, supra note 231.
237
See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Shangbiao Shouquan Quequan
Xingzheng Anjian Ruogan Wenti de Guiding (最高人民法院关于审理商标授权确权行
政案件若干问题的规定), [Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues
Concerning the Hearing of Administrative Cases Involving the Granting and Affirmation
of Trademark Right] (promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 12, 2016, effective Mar. 1,
2017), art. 22, SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. CHINA, http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing34732.html [https://perma.cc/C6FS-Y6JJ].
238
See id.
239
See id. at pmbl.
240
See Pauline Booth & Yi Zhang, Chinese IP Courts Are Increasing Damages
Awards, LAW360 (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/885074/chinese-ipcourts-are-increasing-damages-awards.
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for litigation expenses, including attorney fees. 241 Foreign
companies are slowly but surely winning higher damages in court
as well. In November 2015, the Beijing IP Court awarded 470,000
USD to the Italian company Moncler for trademark infringement it
suffered from a Chinese company.242 In August 2017, New
Balance won 1.5 million USD in damages in the Suzhou IP
Tribunal against the Chinese company New Boom, which
produced and sold shoes with New Balance’s trademarked logo.243
This landmark decision has the highest damages award for a
foreign company in a trademark infringement case in China to
date.244 It was also noted as a victory for foreign companies
attempting to enforce their rights in the Chinese civil courts. 245
Intellectual property experts viewed New Balance’s pursuit of
enforcement in civil courts as a proactive, successful strategy, one
that other foreign companies should implement in China.246 These
recent results for both domestic and foreign companies should
encourage foreign companies to see civil litigation as a worthwhile
investment to combat infringement.
5. The Rise of Preliminary Injunctions
Preliminary injunctions are an additional useful tool for foreign
companies.247 Preliminary injunctions are court rulings ordering a
241

See id.
See Jacob Schindler, Beijing IP Court Grants Maximum Statutory Damages in a
Trademark Case for the First Time, WORLD TRADEMARK REV. (Nov. 19, 2015),
http://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/Blog/detail.aspx?g=700bf3b8-a30a-41e3-ada96890010bd0dd.
243
See Tom Hancock, New Balance Wins $1.5[M] Damages for China Logo
Infringement, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/f696e7ec-87f011e7-bf50-e1c239b45787. This case was handled by the Suzhou IP Tribunal, which is
attached to the Suzhou Intermediate People’s Court. See Li et al., supra note 213.
244
See Sui-lee Wee, New Balance Wins $1.5 Million in Landmark China Trademark
Case, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/22/business/chinanew-balance-trademark.html [https://perma.cc/569V-9Y92].
245
See id.
246
See Yiling Pan, New Balance’s Trademark Win Sets Right Example for Foreign
Brands in China, JING DAILY (Aug. 23, 2017), https://jingdaily.com/new-balancetrademark-win/ [https://perma.cc/DW3J-VMAU]; New Balance Wins US $1.5 Million in
Damages for Trademark Infringement, ASIA IP (Oct. 12, 2017), http://asiaiplaw.com/
article/35/2917/ [https://perma.cc/VV9D-344F].
247
They are also known as “Conduct Preservation” or “Interim Injunctions” in China.
See Zhen Feng & Suyu Yuan, How to Obtain Interim Injunctions in China, INT’L
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party to perform or not perform an act. 248 They were formally
introduced to the civil litigation system in amendments to the
Chinese Civil Procedure Law of 2012. 249 China’s preliminary
injunction requirements closely resemble those of the United
States. The court considers: whether the applicant has the
likelihood of winning the case on the merits; whether the
applicant’s rights are valid; whether there may be irreparable harm
to the applicant; whether the harm caused by the injunction to the
respondent is greater than harm caused to the applicant if no action
is taken; and whether the injunction would harm the public
interest.250 Additionally, the applicant must post a sufficient bond,
or a specified amount of money, to be paid if the applicant fully or
substantially loses the case or if the issuance of the injunction is a
mistake.251 The bond is then used to offset the defendant’s losses in
these situations.252
Their formal introduction was seen as a positive step for
intellectual property rights holders, as they now had a new
opportunity for enforcement. 253 Companies in general are
requesting preliminary injunctions for intellectual property

TRADEMARK ASS’N (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.inta.org/INTABulletin/Pages/Interim_
Injunctions_in_China_7203.aspx [https://perma.cc/3UA8-QGAX].
248
See, e.g., Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 9, 1991; amended Aug. 31, 2012, effective
Jan. 1, 2013), arts. 100–05, CLI.1.183386 (EN) (Lawinfochina).
249
See id.
250
For the original notice in Mandarin see, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shencha
Zhishi Chanquan yu Jingzheng Jiufen Xingwei Baoquan Anjian Shiyong Falu Ruogan
Wenti de Jieshi (Zhengqiu Yijian Gao) ((最高人民法院关于审查知识产权与竞争纠纷
行为保全案件 适用法律若干问题的解释 (征求意见稿)), Zuigao Renmin Fayuan (最
高人民法院) (Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.court.gov.cn/hudong-xiangqing-13517.html
[https://perma.cc/B77U-UTEN]. For the English translation, see, INTERPRETATION OF THE
SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT ON SEVERAL ISSUES CONCERNING LAWS APPLICABLE TO
REVIEW OF THE CONDUCT PRESERVATION FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COMPETITION
DISPUTE CASES (DRAFT FOR COMMENT) art. 7 (2015), IPKEY (Feb. 26, 2015),
www.ipkey.org/en/ip-law-document/download/2519/3310/23
[https://perma.cc/7WC9-JFGU]; Feng & Yuan, supra note 247.
251
See SUP. PEOPLE’S CT., supra note 250, arts. 9, 17–18.
252
See id. art. 18.
253
KRISTIE THOMAS, ASSESSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COMPLIANCE IN
CONTEMPORARY CHINA: THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION TRIPS AGREEMENT 91
(1st ed. 2017).
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infringement purposes more often in the last few years. 254 For
example, in 2015, the Guangzhou IP Court granted a preliminary
injunction for copyright infringement in favor of Blizzard
Entertainment, a California video game company, against Chengdu
Seven Games Limited (“Seven Games”).255 Seven Games created
“Everyone WarCraft,” which infringed Blizzard’s World of
Warcraft game.256 The Guangzhou IP Court ordered Seven Games
and the website used to host the games to cease reproduction,
distribution, and online dissemination.257 In August 2016, the
Beijing IP Court granted an injunction for trademark infringement
in favor of Dutch company Talpa, the owner of the intellectual
property rights in “The Voice” singing competition franchise,
against a Chinese company that began producing a series named
“The Voice of China.” 258 A few months later, the Fujian IP
Tribunal granted an injunction for U.S. clothing company Under
Armour against Chinese company Uncle Martian, with the
underlying trademark infringement case resulting in 300,000 USD
in damages awarded to Under Armour.259 In 2017, the Beijing IP
Court granted a permanent injunction for Iwncomm, a Chinese
internet technology company, against a foreign company, Sony
254

See Jiang Liwei, Preliminary Injunction: The New Favorable of IP Litigation,
CHINA IP MAG. (Aug. 2014), http://www.chinaipmagazine.com/en/journal-show.
asp?id=1121 [https://perma.cc/536T-SW48].
255
See Mark Cohen, The World of Injunctions: Guangzhou Makes Its Mark, CHINA IPR
(Mar. 16, 2015), https://chinaipr.com/2015/03/16/the-world-of-injunctions-guangzhoumakes-its-mark/ [https://perma.cc/QYY3-CKQG]. For the original article see, Weichu
Jieguo Xianchu Jinling Guangzhou Fayuan Yaoqiu Quanmin Moshou Liji Tingyun (未出
结果先出禁令广州法院要求全民魔兽立即停运) [Guangzhou IP Court Grants an
Interim Injunction Halting the Distribution and Operation of Everyone WarCraft: War of
Draenor Immediately], SINA (Mar. 12, 2015, 10:43 AM) (China), http://games.sina.com.
cn/o/z/wow/2015-03-12/1043607766.shtml [https://perma.cc/G9BU-BDYS].
256
SINA, supra note 255.
257
Id.
258
See Eugene Low & Deanna Wong, China: Whose Voice Is It?, LIMEGREEN IP NEWS
(Aug. 30, 2016), http://www.limegreenipnews.com/2016/08/china-whose-voice-is-it/
[https://perma.cc/5Q2S-C959]. The Chinese company, Canxing, previously held the
rights to use the franchise name, but after it lost those rights it began producing “The
Voice of China.” See id.
259
See Bill Donahue, Under Armour Wins TM Ruling in China Over ‘Uncle Martian,’
LAW360 (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/950991. The Fujian division
of the IP Tribunal was established in the 1990s. Robert Slate, Judicial Copyright
Enforcement in China: Shaping World Opinion on TRIPS Compliance, 31 N.C.J. INT’L L.
& COM. REG. 665, 680 (2006).
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Corporation (“Sony”), for standard essential patent infringement
when Sony used Iwncomm’s patent without authorization.260 The
court also ordered Sony to pay 8.62 million RMB (1.25 million
USD) in damages to Iwncomm.261 Expanding the use of
preliminary injunctions to patents, the Guangzhou IP Court granted
the first preliminary injunction for patent infringement on June 22,
2016 for Christian Louboutin Ltd. against Guangzhou Benefit
Cosmetics Co., which had manufactured and sold
infringing lipsticks.262
The cases above are the few examples of foreign companies
using preliminary injunctions, demonstrating they are certainly not
the go-to response for combating infringement. This is the case
despite high grant rates. In Beijing and Shanghai, courts granted
injunctions against trademark infringement 97% of the time. 263
Across China, injunctions were granted in 96% of cases where
there was a finding of trademark infringement.264 The injunction
rate for copyright infringement is similar, with 90% and 88%
granted in Beijing and Shanghai courts, respectively, and 89%
granted across China. 265 The minimal use of injunctions must
change. Preliminary injunctions are a powerful tool for
multinational companies if these companies invest their time in
securing them rather than pursuing ineffective campaigns.
260

See An Injunction Based on a Standard Essential Patent Is Happening in China,
BEIJING E. IP LTD. (Apr. 1, 2017), http://www.beijingeastip.com/type-news/injunctionsep-china/ [https://perma.cc/2X8L-FCD9]; Iwncomm v. Sony: First SEP-Based
Injunction Granted in China, ALLEN & OVERY (Apr. 10, 2017),
http://www.allenovery.com/publications/en-gb/Pages/Iwncomm-v-Sony-first-SEP-basedinjunction-granted-in-China.aspx [https://perma.cc/4M73-3C9B].
261
An Injunction Based on a Standard Essential Patent Is Happening in China,
supra note 260.
262
See Weili Ma, First Preliminary Injunction on Patent Granted by China IP Court to
Christian Louboutin, LINKEDIN (Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/firstpreliminary-injunction-patent-granted-china-ip-court-ma-1; see also Guangzhou IP Court
Issued Its First Preliminary Injunction on Patent Case, JIAQUAN IP LAW,
http://www.jiaquanip.com/news.asp?ArticleID=77&ClassID=40 [https://perma.cc/6JLUBMB9] (last visited Jan. 10, 2018).
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See CIELA TRADEMARK: BEIJING, supra, note 230; CIELA TRADEMARK: SHANGHAI,
supra, note 230.
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CIELA TRADEMARK: ALL COURTS, supra note 170. These figures are as of 2015.
265
CIELA COPYRIGHT: BEIJING, supra note 228; CIELA COPYRIGHT: SHANGHAI, supra
note 228; CIELA COPYRIGHT: ALL COURTS, supra note 170. These figures are as of 2015.
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6. China’s Commitment to Improving Its Civil Litigation
System and What This Means for Foreign Companies
Multinational companies need to change their strategies on
civil litigation. Companies should pressure the government to
focus not on quick enforcement, but on long-lasting deterrence that
comes with civil litigation.266 The government itself has recently
intensified its focus on the civil litigation system. On November
27, 2016, the State Council released a statement entitled: “Opinion
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
(C[P]C) and the State Council on improving the property rights
protection (PRP) system and lawfully protecting property
rights.”267 It was the first time the government set out guidelines
regarding intellectual property rights for lower government bodies
across China, such as the IP Courts.268 The Chinese government
statement openly admitted that intellectual property protection in
China is “weak.”269
Among other improvements, section 9 of the guideline calls for
raising damages and for the implementation of a new punitive
damages system for serious violations. 270 Along with the recent
decisions in the Beijing Watchdata and New Balance cases, these
moves counter prior criticisms that damages awarded were too low
to make civil litigation worth the effort. 271 In addition to these
266

See DIMITROV, supra note 29, at 28.
See Lisa L. Mueller, Property Rights Protection Guideline Released in China, BRIC
WALL (Dec. 27, 2016), https://bricwallblog.com/2016/12/27/property-rights-protectionguideline-released-in-china/ [https://perma.cc/RDK6-2H9U]; see also State Council
Organization Chart, ST. COUNCIL CHINA (Aug. 28, 2014), http://english.gov.cn/
state_council/2014/09/03/content_281474985533579.htm [https://perma.cc/32GC-S3H6].
For the original guideline in Mandarin see, Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan Guanyu
Wanshan Chanquan Baohu Zhidu Yifa Baohu Chanquan de Yijian (中共中央 国务院 关
于完善产权保护制度依法保护产权的意见), Zhongguo Zhengfu Wang Zhongyang
Renmin Zhengfu Menhu Wangzhan ( 中 国 政 府 网 _ 中 央 人 民 政 府 门 户 网 站 ),
(Nov. 27, 2016) (China), http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016-11/27/content_5138533.htm
[https://perma.cc/7D7H-DHAQ].
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changes, in 2017 the State Intellectual Property Office announced a
two-year arbitration mediation pilot program for intellectual
property disputes in key areas such as Beijing and the Shanghai
municipality. 272 As shown above, China has made great strides
with its civil litigation system. As civil litigation—and alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms—improve over time, these will
most likely become the frontline in combating intellectual
property infringement.
However, with the multinational companies’ low use of civil
litigation, there is wasted potential. It is clear that campaigns are
not working. 273 To improve intellectual property enforcement in
China, companies should take the opportunity to enforce their
rights more often in this channel. This does not mean that
companies should bring any case to make a point, only that they
ought to bring winning cases and bring them more often.
Companies should also substantially increase requests for
preliminary injunctions, as it is a new and effective avenue for
remedying infringement.274 Disney led the way with its first civil
judgment in 1994 and—along with other multinational
corporations—should substantially increase its use of civil
litigation and preliminary injunctions as part of its China strategy
to bring more attention to its rights, shape the law, and shut down
counterfeiting operations.275

damages awards in Chinese intellectual property cases); Hancock, supra note 243 (noting
same). The case concerning Beijing Watchdata was discussed in Section III.A.4.
272
See Notice of the General Office of the State Intellectual Property Office on
Conducting Acceptance Check of the Pilot Program of Mediation of Intellectual Property
Disputes, (State Intellectual Prop. Office, Apr. 14, 2017) CLI.4.293549 (EN)
(Lawinfochina),
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=23410&lib=law
[https://perma.cc/4Z2T-6GG5]; Notice of the General Office of the State Intellectual
Property Office on Determining the Fourth Group of Regions Covered by the Pilot
Program of Arbitration Mediation of Intellectual Property Disputes, (State Intellectual
Prop. Office, June 21, 2017) CLI.4.296862 (EN) (Lawinfochina), http://www.lawinfo
china.com/display.aspx?id=23697&lib=law [https://perma.cc/YQ3B-7TSM].
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B. Changing the Chinese Campaign Approach Itself
Despite the problems with the campaigns described in this
Note, campaigns need not be eradicated altogether. It would be
more cost-efficient to modify campaigns, as China develops
intellectual property campaigns every year. Fortunately, there are
examples of more effective campaigns. The examples come from
the United States, where campaigns are also carried out to combat
counterfeit goods, but are implemented differently than Chinese
campaigns. These examples will illustrate how campaigns can run
more effectively. This Section features examples of multinational
corporate alliances that combat counterfeiting, and recommends
corporate alliances for those doing business in China.
If done in an effective way, campaigns can have long-term
results. They could also then be a more fruitful part of a
multinational corporation’s strategy. Perhaps one day a
multinational corporation may be able to balance both effective
campaigns and civil litigation, obtaining the benefits of both
systems, as part of a comprehensive scheme to battle infringement.
1. A New Model for Campaigns: The U.S. “Operation”
Counterfeit automotive parts have become a growing problem
in the United States. 276 The vast majority—between eighty-five
and ninety-five percent—of these counterfeit parts are imported
from mainland China or transferred to Hong Kong and then
shipped abroad.277 Counterfeit parts range from brakes to
airbags.278 The parts are untested and sub-quality, leading
potentially to consumer deaths.279 For example, some counterfeit
airbags were found to contain explosive elements that explode in
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See Intellectual Property Rights Center Warns of Counterfeit Auto Parts, U.S.
IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T (Oct. 2, 2014), https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/
intellectual-property-rights-center-warns-counterfeit-auto-parts#
[https://perma.cc/9S4W-X468].
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AUTOBODY NEWS (May 17, 2016, 8:24 AM), http://www.autobodynews.com/index.php/
industry-news/item/11704-homeland-security-s-bruce-foucart-counterfeit-oem-parts.html
[https://perma.cc/7WBB-8ERK].
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the victim’s face during an accident.280 Online sales have spurred
the counterfeit operations, making it easier for counterfeiters to
reach consumers abroad with their cheaper products.281
Automotive-manufacturing
companies
reported
these
counterfeit airbags to the National Intellectual Property Rights
Coordination Center (“IPRC”).282 The IPRC is the administrative
body created to focus solely on intellectual property theft and
enforcement.283 Led by a director from the Department of
Homeland Security, and deputy directors from the same, the
Federal Bureau of Investigations, and U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, the IPRC also works with enforcement groups
including Interpol, the World Customs Organization, and
representatives from foreign countries.284 The IPRC is further
divided into three units: the Intellectual Property Unit, Outreach
and Training Unit, and the HSI Commercial Fraud Unit.285 Of the
three, the Intellectual Property Unit starts and maintains operations
such as Operation Team Player, which targets the sale and
trafficking of counterfeits sports merchandise and apparel in the
United States. 286 The Intellectual Property Unit also collaborates
with industry partners, such as companies and partner agencies.287
For example, in addition to the IPRC receiving reports from car
companies, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”)
discovered a counterfeit airbag shipment from China at a DHL
facility en route to Tennessee.288 As counterfeit automotive parts
are a health and safety concern, along with a growing intellectual
280

See NAT’L INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS COORDINATION CTR., PUBLIC SERVICE
ANNOUNCEMENT: COUNTERFEIT AUTOMOTIVE PARTS (2014), https://www.iprcenter.gov/
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(May 2, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://www.local10.com/consumer/call-christina/feds-warn-ofcounterfeit-auto-parts [https://perma.cc/57TV-ZXER].
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(last visited Nov. 24, 2017).
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property issue, spin-off investigations were initiated to take action
against this new problem.289
In particular, the IPRC launched Operation Engine Newity
(“Operation”)—a campaign with American characteristics—
focusing on countering “the threat of counterfeit automotive,
aerospace, rail, and heavy industry related components that are
illegally imported and distributed throughout the United States.”290
Some of its strategies include: educating industry stakeholders and
the public, investigating and prosecuting counterfeiters and
traffickers, and barring and confiscating counterfeit goods at places
such as ports of entry. 291 As the IPRC works with members of
different federal agencies, the Operation also relies on members of
different agencies, and coordinates efforts with these agencies.292
For example, it shares information with the U.S. Customs and
Border Protection to discover and halt any incoming counterfeit
goods. 293 Through its efforts, the Operation successfully stops
counterfeits at the border, uncovers counterfeit goods, and
criminally prosecutes both small and large operations.294
One of the Operation’s features is its collaboration with the
industry.295 With the assistance of the IPRC, multinational
corporations created the Automobile Anti-Counterfeiting
Coalition, which meets four times per year, and exchanges
information on its members’ counterfeiting experiences with
federal agencies, such as the IPRC. 296 This is similar to other
corporate alliances, such as the U.S. Golf Manufacturers AntiCounterfeiting Working Group, which is a collaboration of U.S.
289
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golf manufacturing companies working against the counterfeiting
of golf products in China.297 As part of the Operation, corporations
coordinate with law enforcement and other agencies—they
exchange information with the IPRC and other federal agencies
involved through regularly scheduled conference calls and other
types of frequent communication.298 Companies have also created
their own anti-counterfeiting operations through commercials and
by notifying their consumers. For example, Hyundai and Honda
created advertising campaigns through websites and commercials
depicting the differences between counterfeit and authentic car
parts, and illustrating the dramatic disparities between the two
products should the consumer ever experience a car accident.299
2. Key Differences Between U.S. Operations and
Chinese Campaigns
There are key differences between Chinese and U.S.
campaigns. The first is the presence of a dedicated team focusing
on counterfeits. The IPRC has both the Intellectual Property Unit,
which is dedicated to its continuing IP operations,300 and members
from different federal agencies and governments coordinating
these efforts.301 In China, different agencies join a campaign, but
they are not coordinated. 302 This leads to a lack of information
sharing, commitment only when a campaign is launched, and a
297
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[https://perma.cc/PVL9-B2K2] (last visited Nov. 22, 2017).
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waste of resources when some infringers are raided repeatedly or a
single case is reported multiple times.303 The lack of coordinated
effort additionally leads to shirking of duties. 304 Agencies have
different priorities, complicated by their local branches who might
take into account the economic well-being of their locality, and
will let a counterfeiting operation continue for the revenue—
especially when the campaign is left uncoordinated.305
The second difference is that the IPRC’s efforts do not stop
until the problem is solved. Unlike the majority of Chinese
campaigns, operations do not end after a few weeks or months.306
Investigations, seizures, and raids continue for years, and the
protection of intellectual property rights is an ongoing effort. 307
Also, its operations are not responsive in nature. While reports
from automotive companies were coming in, the IPRC was already
conducting an investigation into counterfeit goods when the
counterfeit airbags were discovered by the CBP on their way to
Tennessee.308 In contrast, Chinese campaigns only start after
mounting government or company pressure, or if a crisis occurs,
giving rise to inconsistent and temporary enforcement to appease
groups.309 If China wants to improve its enforcement against
infringement, it will need to modify its campaigns to bring
lasting change.
3. Multinational Corporation Alliance Opportunities
Where does this leave multinational corporations? So far,
multinational corporations in China seem to be working mostly on
their own. Occasionally, there are corporate alliances and
information sharing. For example, Disney is a member of the
Quality Brands Protection Committee (“QBPC”) with other
303
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multinational corporations.310 The QBPC organizes meetings and
seminars with corporations.311 The QBPC’s mission is “[t]o
strengthen cooperation with China’s central and local government
agencies, institutions, enterprises,” and other organizations to
promote “the improvement of China’s IP legal system, the IP
administrative [and] judicial enforcement, the guiding role of
judicial protection, the construction of a fair and orderly legal
environment for economic growth and scientific [and]
technological innovation for global interconnection and
intercommunication.” 312 Yet this broad statement does not focus
on a particular mission or issue—such as a type of counterfeit good
or intellectual property—and instead groups multiple
issues together.
Additionally, the QBPC’s membership spans across different
industries, from clothing stores, food, electronic goods, toys,
cosmetics, films, to car manufacturers. 313 Its Industry Working
Groups, which bring similar companies together, also make it
difficult for a company that may not fit into only one group to
work into this framework.314 For example, Disney could easily fit
into the Creative, Diversified, Sports, Fashion and Life Style, and
Toys and Licensed Goods working groups, but it would be difficult
to invest time into every group to work with members who may
not share or understand Disney’s priorities.315 The QBPC’s
mission and groups are so broad that the alliance may not focus on
the individual needs of companies, the intellectual property laws
that apply to different industries, or different priorities. While the
QBPC alliance membership is a positive step for a corporation to
take, it may not ultimately be the most efficient or effective.
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Multinational corporations such as Disney should not only take
advantage of the civil litigation system more often, but also form
smaller and more specific alliances related to intellectual property
infringement in China, similar to the one Operation Engine Newity
created.316 Disney and other foreign animation or film studios—
such as DreamWorks Animation SKG, Inc. (“Dreamworks”) and
Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. (“Warner Bros.”)—should come
together and share information instead of working alone. These
companies have similar goals and issues in China. All want to
conduct business in China, with Warner Bros. signing a new deal
this year to license hundreds of its films with the popular Chinese
streaming company iQiyi, and DreamWorks creating a joint
venture with a Chinese animation studio to develop more films.317
All only take a twenty-five percent share of box office revenue due
to China’s revenue cap and are subject to Beijing’s quota system,
which allows thirty-four foreign films to be imported annually.318
Any foreign films released in China are assigned limited theatrical
release dates, limiting any profits in China further.319 All
experience infringement of their trademarked and copyrighted
characters, logos, names, and films.320
These companies have also successfully brought cases in
China. For example, DreamWorks brought a civil case to oppose a
person attempting to trademark “KUNG FU PANDA,” and this
316
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(May 30, 2016), https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/disney-wanda-city-china/2016/
05/30/id/731406/ [https://perma.cc/DJ6V-D7CD]; Warner Opens New Front in Piracy
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case led to the creation of prior merchandising rights, a new tool
that companies can use to protect their trademark rights.321 These
companies can share information on infringement, lobby
governments for better laws (such as lowering the threshold for
criminal prosecution), and create a strategy with effective
enforcement actions. They can also create their own long-running
non-government campaigns, taking cues from the IPRC’s
“operations,” that not only have dedicated staff, but also engage
their audiences and encourage them to participate in the anticounterfeiting effort. Disney did this once before with the 2006
hologram sticker campaign, which actually caused Chinese
consumers to report counterfeit goods to Disney.322 Perhaps new,
united, long-term efforts can spark even more of these results. If
similarly-situated companies can come together and coordinate
their actions, then there can be positive, enduring change in China.
CONCLUSION
It is difficult for a multinational corporation to protect its
intellectual property rights in China. Often under pressure to bring
immediate results to a dire situation, the corporation will fall into
the campaign trap. Disney knows this all too well as it attempts to
protect its rights in China. After experiencing counterfeiting, the
company turned to the campaign approach for help. However, the
government campaign intended to protect Disney’s rights, just as
campaigns in the past, had only transient effects. This is because
campaigns are short-term solutions for a long-term problem.
Instead of focusing its efforts on bringing short-term campaigns,
multinational corporations such as Disney should focus on longterm solutions that will deter infringers and bring transformative
effects. Companies should continue taking action, but outside of
the context of a traditional Chinese campaign. A comprehensive
strategy of civil litigation, criminal prosecution, and productive
industry-specific alliances will help bring positive change. The
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Chinese government should also continue to improve its civil
litigation and criminal prosecution systems, and create coordinated
campaigns with dedicated teams that are ongoing for long periods
of time. With the efforts of both multinational corporations and the
government, lasting protection of intellectual property rights can
continue to grow in China.

